83

CLARK v. ALLEN.

stock transferred to her on the books of the corporation. Subsequently, A. executed two codicils, declaring that he cherished to
.B. the feelings of a father, but made no allusion in them to the
transfer of stock which had been made only a short time before.
After A.'s death the certificates were discovered in an envelope in
his writing-desk, directed to himself and with his name in one
corner. A. had never mentioned the fact of the transfer to any
one, except as above stated, and had given no explanations of his
intention. The value of the certificates was not out of proportion
to the size of his estate, which was large, considering the relation
of the parties. Held, that the gift was executed, though the certificates had been retained by the donor, and that the circumstances
of the case rebutted the presumption of a resulting trust.
A. SYDNEY BIDDI.
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A policy of life insurance is a chose in action.
The sale and assignment of a life policy, outstanding and valid, and containing
no prohibition of such alienation, is good, though made to one who has no interest
in the life insured, provided such sale and assignment is a bona fide business
transaction, and not a device to evade law.
Q'iery: Whether in Rhode Island a person can legally take out an original
policy on a life in which he has no interest?

Assumpsrr for money had and received, tried to the court, jury
trial being waived. It appeared that on the 26th December 1868
one Edward T. Ross got his life insured for $2000, payable to his
wife at his decease. His wife was a second wife. He had children
by his former wife, but none by her. She died before him, August
21st 1871. He was then in infirm health and short of means. He
did not pay one premium promptly. The company, however,
accepted payment afterwards and issued. the policy anew, payable
to his legal representatives. On the 2d of January 1872 he
assigned the policy to the defendant, and received the defendant's
note for $125, which was paid April 10th 1872. The surrender
value of the policy at the time of the assignment was $118. The
defendant was Ross's brother-in-law. After the assignment, which
was assented to by the insurers, the defendant paid five quarterly
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premiums of $25 each. Ross died Marci 24th 1873. The defendant collected on the policy $2121.20. The plaintiff, who was
administrator on Ross's estate, brouglt this scion to recover that
amount, less the amount of the note for 'II254 ahd the five quarterly
premiums with interest.
Carles Hart, for plaintiff.
James Tillinghast, for defen~mat.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DURFEE, C. J.-The plaintiff claims that the assignment was
made as security for a loan, and ma - an absolute sale. Testimony was submitted on this point. W 't1ink the assignment was
intended to be an absolute sale.
The plaintiff contends that if the assignment was an absolute
sale, it was void as against public policy, and that he is therefore
entitled to recover the money received on it, less the payments
aforesaid, as money received to his use. The defendant claims
that the assignment, though absolute, is valid, and that he is
entitled to keep the money as his own.
Upon the question thus raised there is a conflict of decision. In
Massachusetts and Indiana it has been decided that a life policy is
not transferable outright to a person who has no interest in the life
insured: Stevens, Adm'r, v. Warren, 101 Mass. 564; _ranklia
Life Ins. Co. v. Hfazzard, 41 Ind. 116. A similar decision (but
in a case having peculiar circumstances) has been made by the
Supreme Court of the United States: Cammack v. Lewis, 15 Wall.
643. The reason given is, that it is unlawful for a person to procure insurance for himself on a life in which he has no interest, and
that therefore it is unlawful for him to take an absolute assignment
of a policy upon a life in which he has no interest; for otherwise
the law could always be easily circumvented by first having a person get his own life insured and then taking an assignment of the
policy. And- it is also argued that the gambling or wagering element is the same, and the temptation to shorten the life insured is
the same in the one case as in the other.
But, on the other hand, it has bebn decided in England that such
an assignment is valid: Ashley v. Ashley, 3 Sim. 149, cited without disapproval by Chancellor KENT, in 3 Kent's Com. 369, note.
The reason given is, that such an assignment is not within the pro-
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hibition of the English statute, 14 Gco. III., cap. 48, and that the
policy, being valid in its inception, is, like any other valid chose in
action, assignable at the, will of the holder, whether the assignee
has an interest in the life insured or not. This view has been
repeatedly affirmed in New York: St. John v. American Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 2 Duer 419; also in 13 N. Y. 31, on appeal; Valton v. IXation'al F und Life Assurance Co., 20 N. Y. 82 ; and see
Gunningham et al. v. Smith's Adm'r, 70 Penna. St. 450.
We think the assignment was valid. A life policy is a chose in
action, a species of property, which the holder may have perfectly
good and innocent reasons for wishing to dispose of. Ie should be
allowed to do so unless the law clearly forbids it. It is said that
such an assignment, if permitted, may be used to circumvent the
law. That is true, if insurance without interest is unlawful ; but
it does not follow that such an assignment is not to be permitted at
all, because, if permitted, it may be abused. Let the abuse, not
the bondfide use, be condemned and defeated. See ShillingAdm'r,
v. Accidental Death Ins. Co., 2 11. & N. 42. It is not claimed
that the parties to the assignment here in question hadlany design
to circumvent or evade the law. Perhaps Cammack v. Lewis, 15
Wall. 643, supra, may be found to be a case of that kind.
Again, the assignment is said to be a gambling transaction, a
mere bet or wager upon the chances of human life. But the
wager was made when the policy was effected, and has the sanction of the law. The assignment simply transfers the policy, as
any other legal chose in action may be transferred, from the holder
to a bondfide purchaser. It is true there is an element of chance
and uncertainty in the transaction; but so there is when a man
takes a transfer of an annuity, or buys a life estate, or an estate
in remainder after a life estate. There is in all these cases a speculation upon the chances of human life. But the transaction has
never been held to be void on that account.
But finally it is urged that the purchaser or assignee subjects
himself to the temptation to shorten the life insured, and thmt this
the policy of the law does not countenance. The law permits the
purchase of an estate in remainder after a life estate, which exposes the purchaser to a similar temptation. It has been decided,
too, that a policy effected by a creditor on the life of his debtor
does not expire when the debt is paid, though the holder then
ceases to be interested in the continuance of the life, and is there-
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after exposed to the same temptation which is supposed to beset
the assignee without interest, to bring it to an end: Dalby v. India
J London Life Assurance Co., 15 C. B. 365; Law v. London
Indisputable Life Polcy Co., 1 Kay & J. 223; Bawls v. Amer.
Life Insurance Co., 8 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 167, s. c. 27 N. Y.
282; Campbell v. N. -E. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 98 Mass.
381; Provident Life Insurance J. Invest. Co. v. Baum, 29 Ind.
236.
If the danger is not sufficient to avoid the policy when the interest ceases, why should it be sufficient to avoid the assignment
to an assignee without interest ? The truth is, it is one thing to
say that a man may take insurance upon the life of another for
no purpose except as a speculation or bet on his chance of' life,
and may repeat the act ad libitum, and quite another thing to
say that he may purchase the policy, as a matter of business,
after it has once been duly issued under the sanction of the law,
and is therefore an existing chose in action or right of property,
which its owner may have the best of reasons for wishing to dispose of. There is in such a purchase, in our opinion, no immorality and no imminent peril to human life. We should have
stkong reasons before we hold that a man shall not dispose of his
own. Courts of justice, while they uphold the great and universally recognised interests of society, ought nevertheless to be cautious about making their own notions of public policy the criterion
of legality, lest, under the semblance of declaring the law, they
in fact usurp the function of legislation: Hilton v. ekersley, 6
El., & B. 47, 64.
We therefore decide that whatever the law of this state may be
in regard to procuring insurance upon the life of another without
any interest in the life insured, it does not forbid the sale and
assignment of a valid policy, which is already in existence, to an
assignee without interest in the life insured, when the assignment
is permitted or not prohibited by the policy, and is made, not as a
contrivance to circumvent the law, but as an honest and bond fide
business transaction.
Judgment for defendant for his costs.
In some of the cases in which contracts relating to life insurance have
been attacked as wagers or gambling
contracts, the courts seem to have overlooked the true nature of these contracts

and the right of property which the assured has in the policy as a chose in
action. In the principal case, however,
the right of the owner of such a policy
to appropriate or dispose of it, as of any

CLARK v. ALLEN.
other property is fully recognised, and
the decision is sustained by the weight
of authority in this country and in England.
Tile cases illustrating the principles
upon which this decision is founded may
perhaps profitably be considered under
four heads :1. The extent of the right of a creditor ,o inure the life of his debtor, and
the effect upon such right as between
the creditor who effects such insurance
and the insurer of the extinguishment
of the debt.
2. How far, and under what circumstance, one, for whose benefit a policy
of life insurance is effected, may assign
the policy, including the power of a
married woman for whose benefit an
insurance is effected on the life of her
husband to assign her interest in such
policy.
3. Under what circumstances such an
assignment, though absolute in terms,
will be regarded simply as collateral
security to the assignee, and when the
assignor or his personal representatives
will e entitled to recover from the
assignee the amount of the policy less
the debt which the policy was assigned
to secure, and the purchase-money and
premiums paid by the assignee, together
with interest.
4. Who is entitled to the proceeds of
a policy of lifb insurance when the
party for whose benefit it is effected died
before the one whose life was insured.
1. Te first class of cases are those
in which the original contract of insurance is made by a creditor with the insurance company, the one whose life is
insured having nothing whatever to do
with the contract, except perhaps, undergoing an examination by the medical
examiner of the insurer. It is very important to keep entirely distinct cases
of this class, from those in which the
contract of insurance is made in the
name of, and the policy is taken out by,
the party whose life is insured. The

failure to observe this distincdon and
the endeavor to base rules of decision
for one class of these cases from decided
cases of the other class has been the
cause of much of the confusion to be
found in this branch of the law. It is
also to be noticed that in most of the
United States these contracts stand cn
a different footing from those made in
England. The statute of 14 Geo. IIL,
c. 48, enacting that "no insuranceshall
be made by any persons on the life of
any person for whose use, benefit, or on
whose account such policy shall be made
shall have no interest, or by way of
wagering," is not in force in this country. The only limit to the right of effecting a valid insurance upon the life
of another is the refusal -of the courts
from motives of public -policy to entertain suits based upon simple wagers or
gambling contracts ; as was said by
SERGEANT, J., in Edgell v. Mclauylin,
6 Whart.' 176, "Courts of justice are
instituted to determine the disputes
among men, necessarily arising from
their existence together in society. The
time and labor of a large class of its
citizens are devoted to the adjustment
of these disputes at a great expense to
the community, and this class is as necessary to the welfare of society as the existence -of any of the occupations in
which men do for others what they cannot do for themselves. But in the innumerable contentions that human affairs
originate, there is sufficient to engross
the time and labor of its tribunals
without occupying them in the investigation of gratuitous contests such as
wagers, which flow sometimes from a
spirit of gambling, sometimes heat of
passion, and sometimes from folly and
indiscretion on the one side and stratagem and cunning on the other. Hence
the more intelligent judnes of modern
times have revolted at examples of this
sort ofsuit, which have been sustained in
a court of justice, such as that in 5 Burrow 2802 of two sons wagering on the
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lives of their fathers, and other judges
have undertaken to refuse to try such
suits, on the ground that the wager was
impertinent or frivolous, and have
turned the plaintiffs out of court. * * *
"In Phillips v. Ives, I Rawle 458,
HUsToN, J., expresses his opinion very
plainly, that though bets were recoverable by the common law of England, it
was not a part of the common law introduced into Pennsylvania, by William
Penn or his successors, nor recognised
in the Act of Assembly, passed in 1777,
which is our guide on that subject. And
I fully concur with him that it is not.
When I look back to the character and
principles which actuated our founders
and predecessors, I am satisfied they
never countenanced such a principle,
but left parties who chose to embark
into contracts of this kind, to recover
as they could, according to the code of
honor under which they origi ited ; and
that it is derogatory to the
bcharacter
and injurious to the interests of the community to sanction them, and to employ
their legal tribunals in investigations
often indecent, often inflammatory, often
impertinent and frivolous, and always
useless, if not noxious in their effects
on society." Therefore, whenever a
plaintiff can show that his intention in
effecting the insurance was not to speculate upon the continuance of the life
insured but to bondfide protect himself
against some loss, which he might
fairly anticipate would be suffered by
him by the death of the party whose life
was insured, the policy will be sustained,
even though the plaintiff may not be
able to show in figures the exact
amount of such anticipated loss, or
even that the loss.certainly ever will be
incurred upon the death of the party
upon whose life the policy was issued.
This doctrine is very well illustrated
by several cases which arose several
years ago in the time of the California
gold excitement, when parties residing
in the east advanced small sums of

money to adventurers for their outfit,
with an agreement that they should receive a share of the profits of the adventure, and then effected an insurance
on the lives of those going out, in
amount much greater than the sum advanced. If the right to effect such an
insurance was dependent upon and commensurate with some fixed debt due,
these policies would have been void for
everything beyond the amount actually
advanced. But in every instance in
which these policies became the subject
of litigation they were sustained : Millcr v. Eagle Ltfe Ins. Co., 2 E. ).
Smith 268; Iloytv. New York L'ftl
Ins.
Co., 3 Bosw. 440; Maurrell v. Trenton
Life ]ns. Co., 10 Cush. 282; Beran v.
Connecticut Life Ins. Co., 23 Conn. 244.
It therefore is clear that it is not the
loss of a debt arising from the death of
the party whose life is insured that the
insurance company agrees to indemnify
the creditor against, because if such was
the nature of the contract, the plaintiff,
before he could recover on such policy,
would be obliged to prove not only
the death but also that the estate of his
debtor was insolvent. For, to this extreme conclusion we must go, if the
contract of life insurance is to be regarded as one purely of indemnity
against certain pecuniary loss. Neither
is it necessary under our American decisions that the debt which entitles a
creditor to insure the life of his debtor
shotild be one which could be enforced
in a court of law. A moral obligation
on the part of the debtor to pay the
money is sufficient, for the existence of
such obligation gives the creditor an
interest in the continuance of the life
of his debtor ; for the debtor, while he
lives, by payment of the debt, may relieve himself from that obligation.
This principle is exemplified in Rivers
v. Gregg, 5 Richardson Eq. 274, where
an insurance by a creditor upon the
life of his infant debtor was sustained,
although no action could have been
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maintained against the infant for tli
debt, which was not contracted for
neccesarics furnished ; and so in Rawlsv.
Ain. LiA Jns. Co, 3 Am. Law Reg. N. S.
167, it was said that a creditor whose debt
had bcen barred by the Statute of Limitations, was still entitled to inqure the
life of his debtor. "Regarding the
policy in this case as substantially a
contract of indemnity against the loss
of the plaintiff's debt, and that us an
interest was required to support its inception, a continuance of that interest
is essential to its perpetuity, there was
no pretence that the debt or any part of
it had been paid. All that the case
showed was that the Statute of Limitations had apparently run against the
demand of the plaintiff at the death of
the insured. But suppose the statute
had attached, the interest of the plaintiffa a creditor in the continuance of
the life of his debtor had not ceased entirely. The debt was not extinguished
as in the case of payment. It might be
renewed by a new promise, and indeed
without such promise be enforced by
action, unless the defence of the statute
was directly interposed. It is not a
legal presumption that when the Statute
of Limitations has once run, the debtor
will refuse to revive the debt by a new
promise, or interpose the defence of the
statute in an action to recover it."
Another important principle has been
established in the American cases, and
is now recognised in the English courts,
that it is enough if the party effecting
an insurance had an insurable interest
in the life insured at the inception of
the policy, and it is not necessary that
this interest should continue and exist
at the time of the death of the person
whose life is insured. So that the insurer cannot defend against the payment
of the policy, upon the ground that the
creditor effecting it has received the debt
from his debtor. There is a full and
clear discussion of this question in Lau
v. London [is. Co., I Kay & J. Ch. 223,
VOL. XXVI.-12

where Sir W. PAGE WoOD, V.-C., says,
"'Policies of insurance against fire or
marine risk are contracts to recoup the
loss which parties may sustain from particular causes. When such loss is made
good aliunde the companies are not
liable for a loss which has not occurred,
but in a life policy there is no such provision. The policy never refers to the
reason for effecting it. It is simply a
contract that in consideration of a certain
annual payment, the company will pay
at a future time a fixed sum, calculated
by them with reference to the value of
the premiums which are to be paid, in
order to purchase the postponed payment.
Whatever event may happen meanwhile
is a matter of indifference to the company. They do not found their calculations upon that, but simply upon the
probability of human life, and they get
paid the full value of that calculation.
On what principle can itbe said that
if some one else satisfies the risk on account of which the policy may have been
effected, the company should be released from their contract. The company would be in the same position,
whether the object of the insured were
accomplished or not; whether he were
in a better or worse position could have
no effect upon the contract with the
company, which was simply calculated
upon the value of the life which they
had to insure."
2. Of an entirely different class, and
to be determined by entirely different
principles, are the cases in which a party
effects an insurance on his own life,
and then immediately appoints some
other person as the beneficiary, or at a
subsequent period assigns to another,
either by way of gift, or for a consideration. the right to receive the proceeds
upon his death. On no sound principle
can this right be doubted. Every person has the right to effect an insurance
on his own life, and a contract so made
can never he avoided by the insurer as
a wagering contract, because some third
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party by a private arrangement made
between himself and the insured becomes
entitled to receive the insurance money.
Where, as in Pennsylvania, the common law forms of procedure are maintained, and the assignee of a contract is
obliged to sue in the name and on the
right of the original contractor, it is
very plain that the defendant cannot set
up a defence to a contract so made, that
it would hare been contrary to the policy of the law if made with the use
plaintiff. The confusion has been introduced into the decisions of some
other states by the loose forms of pleading and procedure misleading the courts
into viewing the contract as one made
with the assignee, who sues as the legal
plaintiff, and then letting in pleas framed
upon that hypothesis, which if the hypothesis were true might be sustained.
This is one of the many illustrations of
the fact that innovations upon the common law procedure are to be made
slowly and with great care, for in seeking to rid ourselves of forms which seem
to be cumbrous, we may involve ourselves in confusions from which the use
of these forms would preserve us. Still,
however, the weight of authority is in
favor of the sounder doctrine that one
effecting an insurance on his own life,
becomes thereby the owner of a chose
in action which he may dispose of either
by way of gift or sale, without affecting
the validity of the policy, except in so
far as the rights of the parties are governed by the express terms of the policy,
many of the policies containing a condition avoiding the policy upon an assignment without the assent of the insurer.
In such a case the terms of the policy
must be complied with.
In St. Johin v. Anerican Life Ins. Co.,
13 N. Y. 31, N. insured his own life,
payable to himself, his executors, administrators and assigns; he subsequently assigned it to St. John, the plaintiff,
who paid for it a small amount compared
with the face value of the policy. The

insurance company, upon the death of
the insured, claimed that St. Joln was
only entitled to receive the amount he
had paid for the policy with interest and
the premiums paid by him subsequent to
the assignment. The plaintiff, however,
was held to be entitled to receive the
full amount insured, the court saying,
"Policies of insurance are choses in
action, they are governed by the same
principles applicable to uther agreements involving pecuniary obligations.
It is not- necessary that the assignee
should have an insurable interest in the
life of the insured in order to entitle
him to recover the amount of insurance.
If the policies were valid in their inception, the assignment of. them to the
plaintiff did not change the liability of
the company.2 In Valton v. lVeatjond
Ils. Co., 20 N. Y. 32, in a similar case,
the court said, " Upon the trial there
was no proof but that S. obtained the
policy for his own benefit. If he so
obtained it, he had the right to dispose
of it as he saw fit, and it would be no
defence against his assignees that they
had no Interest in his life." The court
here seems to take it for granted that if
S., whose life was insured had combined
at the issuing of the policy with Valton,
to whom the policy was assigned, to
thus effect for Valton an insurance upon
a life in which he had no interest, the
company might have a better ground of
defence. To sustain such a defence,
the burden of proof would be upon the
company to show a fraudulent combination to impose upon them. But where
there is no attempt to conceal from the
company the real parties in interest and
the company assents to the appointment
of any particular person to receive the
proceeds of the policy when it becomes
payable, there is no principle of law or
public policy which prevents one who
insures his own life from having the
policy at its inception marked to the use
of any one to whom he may see fit to
donate it.
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Provident L;fe Ins. Co. v. Bintn, 29
Ind. 236. In this case a policy was
and
taken out by A. on his own life.
made payable to B. In an action by
B. against the company the tourt
said, " Th position assumed by the
company in argument that this policy
is one of indemnity and that the
plaintiff must show an interest in the
lire or the aseured does not, we think,
arise in this case ; the policy in terms
declares that the company insures A.
Baum agnainst loss of life in the sum of
$30 3. It cannot be questioned that a
person has an insurable interest in his
own life, and that he may effect such
insurance antd appoint any one to receive the money in case of his death
during the existence of such policy. It
is not for the insurance company, after
executing such a contract and agreeing
to the appointment so made, to question
the right of such appointee to maintain
the action. If there should eany controversy as to the distribution among
the heirs of the deceased of the sum so
contracted to be paid it does not concern the insurers. The company contracted with the insured to pay the
money to the plaintiff, and upon such
payment being made it will be discharged from all responsibility. So far
as the insuranue company is interested
the contract is efletive as an appointment of the plaintiff to receive the sum
insured."
In (Connlyellv. New England Ins. Co.,
98 M ss. 381, A. effected an insurance
on hii own life, and designiated the
plaintiff, who had no direct interest in
his life, ai the recipient of the proceeds.
In uqstaining the policy, the court said:
"It is the interest of A. in his own life
that supporti the policy. The plaintiff
did not, by virtue of the clause declaring
the policy to be for her benefit, become
the assured. She is merely the person
deign:itc.l by agreement of the parties
to receive the proceeds of the policy
upon the death of the assured. It was

not, therefore, necessary that she should
show that ble had an interest in the life
of A. by which the policy coull e supported as a pohcy to herself as the
assured." So albo i Awericau Ins. Co.
v. Robertsl.w, 2 Casey 189, where a
debtor insured his life for an amount
far exceeding the debt, anl made it
-payable to a creditor, SHAuswooD, J.,
in sustaining the policy, said : "It is
on the principles of public policy and
good morals alone that our courts avoid
wagering contracts. In this case the
contract was really made with Dyson ;
he insured his own life ; the consideration moved from him; the company
knew they were dealing with him;
there was no fraud, misrepresentation
or concealment. I cau see no good
reason why a man having an insurable
interest may not insure it, and present
the policy as a gift to a friend ; and
if such agreement to give be made at
the very time of the contract, why may
not the policy be made at once in the
name of the donee, the whole transaction being ihona fide?"
In conflict, however, with these decisions is the case of The Franklin Ins.
Co. v. Hazzard, 41 Ind. 116, in which
a policy for $3000 was issued, payable
to the assured, his executors, administrators ani assigns ; he being unable to
pay the premium, sold it to the plaintiff
for $20. In an action against the company the court said - "In this case
there was but a simple purchase of the
policy by Hlazzard. Ile had no interest
whatever in the life of the assured ; he
was a mere speculator upon the probabilities of human life. His contract
of purchase was essentially a wager
upon the lire of Cone, and its interests
lay in the payment of few or no intermediate annual premiums ani the early
happening of the event which was to
entitle him to the $3000. By his purchase lie became interested in the early
death of the assured. We are of opinion
that the law will not uphold such a pur-
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* chase, and that the plaintiff acquired no
right to the policy or to the sum secured
thereby. Life insurance policies are
assignable, to be sure: but in our
opinion they are not assignable to one
who buys them merely as matter of
speculation without interest in the fife
of the assured."
This case is followed by a late Kansascase, The Missouri Valley Life Ins. Co.
v. Siurges (not yet reported), in which
one Haynes, having insured his life for
$2000, some time afterwards sold it to
one Sturges.. Upop his death, the company were relieved from the payment
of the policy fbr the same reasons as
given in the last case.
But these cases are opposed to the
weight of authority, and in addition to
the cases already cited where the better
doctrine is recognised, there are several
more in which collateral questions are
principally discussed, but in which the
judgment is predicated upon the assignable nature of a policy of life insurance
as an ordinary chose in action. In
Phillips v. Eestwood, Lloyd & Gool
(Ir. Rep.) 270, Lord SUGDEN held that
a policy of insurance passed by will
tinder the words "all my bonds, debentures and funded property." In Elliott's
Eecutor'sAppeal, 14 Wright 75, READ,
J., in deciding that the assignment by
an insolvent debtor to his wife of policies to a large amount which he had
effected on his own life, was fraudulent,
said: "Policies in good offices, after
fire or seven years' standing, are
always 'saleable, and a considerable
number are sold by auction every
"We noticed," says the Edyear."
inburg Review of January 1859, Cthe
advertisement of a sale in Dublin of
twenty-seven policies of insurance in
various offices. It is worthy of remark
that they generally find purchasers at
fair values when effected in the firstclass offices. The offices themselves
will state the value of their own policies
for a fee, and the common practice is

to obtain the office value and that of an
independent actuary before the sale."
This well-recognised practice in England has never had a doubt thrown upon
its legality, although the English courts
have been much more strictly bound
thafi ours by the statute of 14 Gee III.,
c. 48. In Fortescue v. Barnett, 3 Myl.
& Keen 35, B. made a voluntary assignment by deed of a policy of insurance
upon his own life to trustees, for the
benefit of C. ; the deed was delivered to
the trustees, but the grantor retained
the policy in his possession. No notice
of the asgignment was given to the
insurer, and B. subsequently surrendered for a valuable consideration the
policy to the insurer Upon a bill filed
by the trustees to have the policy
replaced, the court held that the complainants were entitled to the relief
prayed for. The assignable nature of
the policy is also fully recognised in
Crossleg v. Glasgow Ins. Co., Law Rep.
4 Ch. Div. 421.
In Bond v. Bunting, 28 P. F. Smith
210, a wife having insured the life of
her husband' for $10,000, joined with
him in executing an instrument under
seal, by which the amount insured
above the sum of $5000 was assigned
to a trustee for the children of the husband by a former marriage. The court
never doubted, during a very elaborate
discussion of the case, that a policy of
insurance was an assignable chose in
action.
In several of the states, policies effected for the benefit of married women
on the lives of their husbands, by virtue
of the interpretation given to statutes
protecting them from their husband's
creditors are placed on a peculiar basis,
the courts holding that they are therefore
non-assignable : Uniy Ins. Co. v. Dugan, 118 Mass. 219, but in this case the
assignee was held to be entitled to a
return of the premiums he had paid
with interest. The same effect has been
given to a New York statute in Eadie v.

CLARK V. ALLEN.

Slimmon, 26 N. Y. 1, and Barry v.
Equitabl, Lie Ins, (o., 59 Id. 587. In
both of these cases, however, the assignments were executed by the uives
under duress, so that the cases lose
force as authorities upon the point for
which they are ordinarily cited. To
the same effect arc Goud v. Emerson,
99 Mas-;. 154, and Knuicktrbucker Ins.
Co. v. Weitz, Id. 157. In Burroughs
v. Spate Ing. Co., 97 Blass. 359, where
a policy was taken out by a husband
and payable to his executors, for the
benefit of his wife and children. in the
manner directed by the intestate act,
and, subsequently, the husband and
wife assigned the policy to the plaintiff.
The wife predeceased her husband.
The plaintiff was held to be entitled to
recover the amount of the policy from
the company, tie court saying that the
equitable rights of the children must be
settled in another form of action. In
Coa cimcdA Ins. Co. v. Burrougks, 34
Conn. 305, which, however, was simply
an interpleader between the assignee and
the children, the policy was effected by
the husband payable to his wife, and if
she predeceased him then to the children.
The husband and wife assigned the policy, and the wife died before the husband,
upon his death, in this contest between
the assignee and the children, it was
held that the assignment only passed the
contingent interest of the wife, and as
that interest had lapsed by her death
the children's rights were not affected.
In Missouri, a policy taken out by a
wife on the life of her husband cannot
be assigned : Charter Oak Ins. Co. v.
Branad, 47 Mfo. 419, but a policy taken
out by the husband for her benefit, he
paying the premiums may be assigned
by their joint instrument: Baker v.
I'mmn, 47 M1o. 453.
3. The proposition then being established that the insurer can not set up a
want of insurable interest in the life
insured on the part of the assignee, a
third class of cases arises, in which the

relative rights of the assignor andl assignee of an insurance policy are discused. The question of these cases
simply i,, When a policy of life insurance i. n-mgncd by a debtor to his creditor, is such assignment to be viewed
simply in the nature of an indemnity,
giving the creditor collateral security
which the debtor, or his estate, is entitled to a return of upon the payment or
extinguishment of the debt which the
policy was assigned to secure.
The only light an investigation of the
cases throws upon this question is that
in each particular case it is a question
of fact to he determined by the evidence.
It may, however, be profitable to consider the facts of the cases, first, in
which the assignment has been construed
to be conditional, and the debtor or his
estate have been entitled upon payment
of the debt to have a return of the policy.
In Cunningham v. Smilh's Executors,
20 P. F. Smith 458, a policy was effected by Smith upon his own life and
immediately assigned to Cunningham,
with whom the insured was about to
enter into relations as a commercial
correspondent at Vera Cruz, and in the
course of business likely to become indebted to. Cunningham paid the premium.
Smith, very shortly after his
arrival at Vera Cruz, died of yellow
fever. A small sum of money bad
been advanced to Smith by Cunningham, upon whom a demand was now
made by Smith's executors for the
amount realized from the insurance
policy less the advances. The question
was left to the jury upon the evidence
to determine whether the assignment
was intended to be absolute or by way
of collateral security, and the jury found
that the intention of the parties was
that it was given as collateral security,
but the Supreme Court afterward reviewing the evidence, held that there was no
evidence to submit to the jury in support of this hypothesis and reversed the
judgment.
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In Bruce v. Garden, Law Rep. 5
Chnnc. 31, an army agent, to whom
an officer was largely indebted on the
balance of an account, effected in his
own name policies on the life of the
officer, and in his books the account of
the officer was charged with the premiums paid, and with interest on the
balances, including premiums. It was
argued for the estate of the officer which
claimed the surplus of the amount received from the policy after repayment
to the agent of the amount of the debt,
premiums and interest, that the fact of
charging the officer's account with the
amount of premiums paid evinced an
intention to treat the policy as collateral
security for the debt, but Lord HAT11ERLY, reversing JAMES, Vice-Chancel]or, said, " This case seems to come
within principles recognised by the
court, and the authorities on the subject
are so clear that .we have only to consider what is the effect of the evidence.
The court requires distinct evidence of
a contract that the creditor has agreed
to effect a policy and that the debtor
has agreed to pay tlfe premiums, and in
that case the policy will be held in trust
for the debtor. I must, therefore, examine whether such a contract has been
established in this case." The evidence
was then reviewed, showing that Major
Bruce never knew that these premiums
were being charged against him, and
that he never had agreed to pay them.
In Knox v. Turner, Law Rep. 5 Ch.
515, Knox being entitled to the income
of large sums of stock in consideration
of $3999 paid to him by Turner, covenanted to pay to Turner an annuity of
$318 for his (Knox's) life, and assigned
the annual proceeds of the stock for security, and further covenanted to appear
at an insurance office in order to have
his life insured, and to pay Turner extra premiums which might be imposed
in consequence of his goiig beyond the
seas. The deed contdined a provision
enabling Knox to repurchase the an-

nuity at any time for $3999. Knox
subsequently repurchased the annuity,
and then demanded an assignment to
him of the policy of insurance, but Lord
HATHERLY sait], "The plaintiff in this
case has confused the purchase of a redeemable annuity with an advance as a
loan, two things quite different, not in
form merely, but in substance, for in
the latter case the person who receives
the money remains a debtor, in the
former case be does not. Major Knox
was obviously in want of money, and
might have raised it either by borrowing or by the sale of a life annuity, the
latter plan being probably adopted in
order to evade the usury laws, but whatever was the motive he knew what he
was doing ; at present he would probably
mortgage his life interest and insure his
life, covenanting to pay the interest and
premiumsbut then lie would be a debtor,
and whenever the lender wanted to be
paid lie might proceed to sue the borrower, or might sell under a power of
sale, and the relation of debtor and
creditor would exist between them. If
the other plan was adopted, the person
in want of money might sell a life annuity for a given sum and might reserve
the option of repurchasing the annuity
on given terms, but until the repurchase
the annuity would remain, and the
holder of the annuity would have no
one against whom to proceed, but must
depend upon his annuity for repayment.
No doubt, in making the bargain he
takes an annuity large enough to cover
the contingency of the death of the
grantor, which is in fact an annuity
large enough to pay the interest, and to
insure the life of the grantor for the
principal.
It was argued that this
policy of insurance was in fact bought
with Major Knox's money, but that
was not so, as the annuity was Turner's
until it was repurchased, and he could
ether save it or spend it in premiums
or in any other way. As a prudent
man he laid out part of it in insuring
the life of Knox. But suppose he had
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ums that an action could be maintained
against him by his creditor for that
amount. If such a contract is shown,
then the policy is to be regarded as colwould, have tiny claimio the money so
accumulated, and does it make any dif- lateral security, and the debtor is ettifercuce that the money was ivc ,tcd in tled to it upon the extinguishment of
another way ? I am altogether unable the principal debt: Frcme v. L3erade, 2
to understand the view which is taken DeG. & J. 582.
Gottlieb v. Cranch, 4 DeG., M. & G.
by Knox in making this claim. Where
is the contract between Knox and Tur- 440, is in facts like to Knox v. Turner,
ner ? The only thing alleged is that supra, and was decided upon similar
grounds.
the deed contains a provision that if
In the following cases, however,
Knox goes abroad or enters the military
service again-in either of which cases the debtor was held to be entitled
the purchaser of the annuity would find to a return of the policy upon the
a difficult " in securing his capital-then extinguishment of the debt- DrysKnox would repay the additional pre- dale v. Ptggott, 8 ])eGex, M. & G.
miums required. No doubt the pur- 546. and Lake v. Burtion, Id. 440. In
chaser of the annuity intended it to be both of these cases the contract was
large enough to pay him five per cent. interpreted to impose a liability upon
interest and the premiums necessary to the debtor to pay the premiums. To
secure the capital, and he would he put the same effect, L.a v. Hnton, 5 DeGex,
M. & G. 823.
out of his calculations if Knox went
In Carmnck v. Lewis, 15 Wallace
abroad, he therefore stipulated for a
further payment if he was put to extra 643, the evidence that the assignexpense. I think that there is a funda- ment was intended simply as colmental error in treating this as a case lateral security, was indisputable, and
in ,Stvens v. la~rren, 101 Mass. 564,
of debtor and creditor and in speaking
of this insurance money as property the court in a contest between the ascreated bv Knox's money. I am un- signee and personal representatives of
able to see that there was any relation the debtor refused to sustain an assignof debtor and creditor between Knox ment except for the amount of the debt
and Turner and it appears to me that to be protected, the court saying, "1the
the annuity belonged not to Knox, but general rule recognised by the courts
to the purchaser until Knox chose to has been that no one can have an insurbuy it back."
ance upon the life of another unless
In A.s;jhij v. A.Aey, 3 Sim. 149,
lie has an interest ia the continuance
A. insured his life and afterwards of that hfi. W. had no such interest
assigned the policy to B. for a nom- and could not legally have procured
inal consideration ; B. assigned it to insurance upon the life of Barton.
Ve
P. for a valuable con-ideration, and understand- the answer to deny that the
then 1). sold it to E. On a bill by D. policy was held by W. as creditor and
against E. for specific performance it for his security and to assert an absowas held that D. had a good title and lute right by purchise. The rule of
that E. was bound to complete the con- law against gambling policies could be
tract.
completely evaded if the court were to
A diqtinguishing element in the deter- give to such transfer the effect of equitmination of these cages seems to be, able assignments to be sustained and
whether the one whose life is insured enforced against the representatives of
so contracts himself to pay the premi- the assured."- This position, however,
not done so and had either kept the
money il a box or laid it out at interest,
could it then be pretended that Knox
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is not supported by the weight of anthority.
4. A policy of life insurance being a
chose in action upon the death of the
party to whom it is payable during the
continuance of the life insured, passes
to his personal representatives. This
contingency is often expressly provided
for in the policy, in which case upon
the happening of the contingency it
becomes payable to the parties.named.
This is especially so in cases where a
policy on the life of a husband is made
payable to a wife, and in case of her
death, the husband surviving, to the
children. But in the absence of such
provisions expressed in the policy,or of
some statutory enactment, the children
are only entitled to such portion of the
proceeds of the policy as undar the intestate law they would take of the ordiPary personal estate.
In Deginther's Appeal, 4 Weekly
Notes (Philadelphia) 95, a married
woman, the holder of a policy of insurance on her husband's life, payable
generally to her executors, administrators and assigns, died intestate in the
lifeof her husband; upon his death, the
proceeds of the policy were paid to her
administrator, and it was held that the
husband's executor was entitled to that
proportion of the proceeds as a surviving husband took of his wife's personalty under the intestate act, SHARSWOOD,
J., saying, "The contention is, that as
the husband survived his wife the estate
vested in the wife's administrator at the
moment of his death, and that having
then ceased to exist, he could have had
no claim upon his wife's estate which
could pass to his personal representative. The argument appears to be too
refined. If it be a sound universal proposition that a man's representatives are
not entitled to.anything not vested in
him at the time of his death, though
coming to his estate on the happening
of a subsequent contingency3 neither
could'the wife's representatives be enti-

tled under this construction of the law,
flor she was not possessed of this property at the time of her death."
In Huston v. .Aerrfeld, 51 Ind. 24,
under similar circumstances there was a
similar decision, the court saying, "a
policy of insurance is a chose in action
governed by the same principles applicable to other agreements involving pecuniary obligations. A life policy is
an agreement to pay a sum of money
at the termination of the life insured.
Therefore as a chose in action, being
personal property upon the death of the
party holding and owning it, it would
vest in the heirs of such person, subject
to the payment of debts."
In Libb! v. Lrbby, 37 Me. 359, a policy
was effected for the benefit of a wife, and
if she predeceased her husband, for their
children. The wife died first, and then
the children, last of all the father.
The next of kin of the children were
awarded the proceeds of the policy.
So in .ContinentalIns. Co. v. Palmer,
42 Conn. 60, a policy payable to
the children of the insured upon the
death of one of the payees passed to
his next of kin, the court saying, "The
moment this policy was executed and
delivered it became property and the
.title to it vested in some one. It will
not be claimed that it vested in the
person whose life was insured. It must
then have vested in the payees. It was
visible, tangible property, and like any
other insurance policy it was capable
of assignment and had an appreciable
value."
In Massachusetts, however, by virtue
of statutory provisions, a policy in
favor of a wife upon her death before
her husband vests in he' children absolutely : Swan v. Snow, IIAllen 224.
In Norberry v. Oitchell, 1 Barb. Ch.
264, a husband effected a policy on his
own life, payable to his wife, and in case
of her death, him surviving, to their
child. All three were lost at sea;
there being no evidence who was the
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survivor, the httthand's admiunitrator
wa,; awarded the proceeds of the policy.
5. 1,livic elrcted by one relative
on the life of another arc now sustained without any evidence of direct
pecuniary relationi

exi-tiuig

between

th In. 'Tiue possible benefit which one
may he supposed to anticipate from the
coitinuance of the life of the other is
sutfi,.icut without actual lo-- or gain.
In . "tna InsuranceCo. v. F",e,
K
4 Otto
561, a plleyi( by a sister on the lifb of
a brother, on whom she was not dependent tir support or pecuniary as-istaice, w.it sutaincd. 'l'hi extends the
doctrine of L'.rd Y. Dall, 12 Mass. 11,
where the policy was taken out by a
siter who was in part maintained by
the brother whose life she insured. In

,m,,
v. A~s, rr', J.,urance Co., 3 Weekly
Notes (Philada.) 201, it was decided
that an adult son might efict a valid

in-uranee on the life of his father, aid
in CIt.,ioolmiv. .;,nal
Cqital Ins. Co.,
52 Mo. 213, an unmarried wonman upon
the life of the man to whom she was
engaged to be married.
In McKee v.
J'Iu'ni.r his. Co., 28 Mo 383, a wife
efrected an insurance on the life of her
Isband, from whom she was subsequently divorced. It was heluthat the
policy was not thereby rendered void
for want of insurable interest. Milrhell
v. Union Ins. Co., 45 Me. 104, and
Loomis v. Euyle lits. Co., 6 Gray 396,
establish the right of a parent to insure
the life of his child.
R. C. D., Ja.
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WILLIAM IIERRIES v. 0. C. NORVELL, INrLEADED, &C.
A reporter and a city editor of a newspaper are laborers or servants within the
meaning of a statute making stockholders personally liable for the services of
laborers and servants of the corporation.
The test as to who shall be deemed a laborer or servant within such a statute,
cannot le limited to manual labor only, nor that the person shall be, through igno.
rance, &c., incapable of guarding himself by a contract in advance, but must vary
according to the nature of the services in relation to the business.

Tim; was an action against defendants as stockholders of a corporation, known as the "New York Republican Newspaper Associa-

tion," formed under the general manufacturing law of 1848, and
the amendments thereof, for "work, labor and services," performed
for the corporation. The services, as the complaint alleged, were
rendered as "city editor," as " assistant city editor," and as
"reporter," for the newspaper published by the association. The
plaintiff was the assignee of the claims of the persons rendering the
services ; judgment had been recovered against the association upon
the claims, and execution returned unsatisfied. The defendant,
Korvell, demurred to the complaint.
Denis A. Spellissy, for plaintiff.
Tomlikins TT'stervelt, for defendant.
VoL. XXVI.-13
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
VAN VORST, J.-Although there are several causes of demurrer
assigned, only such will be considered as were urged upon the hearing and were argued. It is claimed by the defendant that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action,
it being urged in support of the objection that the stockholders of
the corporation are not liable for services rendered by a "city," or
"9assistant city editor," or "reporter," for the "newspaper association."
Sect. 18 of the Act of February 17th 1848, under which, and
the amendments thereof, the association 'was incorporated, provides
"that the stockholders of any company organized under this act,
shall be jointly and severally, individually liable for all debts that
may be due and owing to all their laborers,servants and apprentices,
for services performed for such corporation."
The general subject raised by the demurrer has already had consideration in several repdrted oases, in some of which the section of
of the act in question was considered, and in others, a kindred section, under the general railroad.act.
Conant v. Van Seha4ek, 24 Barb. 86, was an action to enforce
tht liability of stockholders, under the 10th section of the general
railroad act, which provides that all stockholders of corporations
organized under that act shall be jointly and severally liable for all
debts due or owing to any of its "laborers or servants" for' services
performed for the corporation.
The claim sought to be enforced, and which was upheld, was in
plaintits favor for services as "civil engineer," and of a "rodman," in his employ. The court, in its opinion, GOULD, J., says,
"The engineer,-the master mechanic, the contractor, is as fully entitled to its benefits [that is, of the section in question], as the man
who'shoveIs .gravel."
Erickson v. .Brown, 38 Barb. 390, was under an act incorporating the Liverpool and United States Steamship Company, which
provided that the stockholders should be individually liable for
debts due and owing to its "laborers and operators," for services
performed for the corporation. The word "servant" is not used
in that act. It was held in that action that a "consulting engineer"
who rendered services as such, is not within the language or policy
of the act. The learned judge who delivered the opinion says:
"The decision in Conant v. Van Schaick does not touch this case."
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Aitken v. IMarren, 24 N. Y. 482, holds that "a contractor" for
the construction of a rhilroal is not a "laborer" or "servant" withill
the provisions of the general railroad act, making stockholders
personally liable for the debts of the company.
l1illianson v. JVbids'worth, 49 Barb. 274, decides that a " civil
engineer" and travelling agent at a fixed salary, is a servant of the
corporation within tho meaning of the 18th section of the Act of
1848. This decision is in accord with Conant v. fan ,Shaik,supra, which does not appear to have been questioned as yet.
In Coffin v. Re 1 nolds, 37 N. Y. 640, it is held that the "secret~irv" of a corporation, organized under the Act of 1848, is not a.
laborer or servant of the corporation, within the meaning of the
18th section of the act in question. This case refers to and does
not question or dissent from Conant v. T'an Shaick. The docision is placed on the ground that the "secretary" is an officer of
the company ; GRoVER, J., says, p. 647, "I think that neither the
services of the secretary, nor those of any other officer of the corporation, comes within the section, and that a stockholder is not
liable therefor."
The result reached by these decisions is, that the claimant, to
hold a stockholder liable for his services, must come strictly within
the denomination of a "laborer," "servant," or "operative" of the
corporation, and that neither a " contractor," who undertakes to
build a railroad for a corporation, nor an "officer" thereof, is such
laborer or servant; and that a consulting " enginer," who renders
services as suth, is not a "laborer" or "operative," whether he
comes within the denomination of "servant" or not, as it was not
necessary to be decided. But on the other hand, it is decided that an
engineer"a "civil engineer"-and travelling agent are within
the terms "laborers and servants." It is reasonable to conclude
that the business of the corporation, and the character of services
required for its transaction, would have some influence in determining whether a given service was within the terms of the 18th
section of the act.
A company, organized and operating a railroad, must needs have
laborers and servants performing work diflerent in character from
that rendered by persons in the same relation for a corporation engaged in publis hing a newspaper. The test cannot unalterably be
that the services intended to be protected should proceed fron
manual effort exclusively, nor that the persons to be shielded, must
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of necessity be by occasion of ignorance, incapable of guarding themselves, through contracts made in advance.
I do not think the section of the act in question, is subject to
such limitations.
I will consider the services for which a claim is preferred in the
action in an inverse order from that in which they stand in the
complaint.
The particular services
. And first with regard to a "reporter."
rendered by him in this case, do not appear in the complaint. The
claim is for'work, labor and services as reporter; the services of a
reporter for a newspaper, are commonly well understood, as is tbe
meaning of the word. His duties in reporting proceedings of courts,
public meetings, legislative assemblies, and other services of a kindred character, are often laborious in the extreme, as they are responsible. His duties do not terminate with the day, but often
extend into the night also. He must needs employ not only his
hands constantly, but his eyes, his ears and his brain also. The
value of his services to his employer depends on his fidelity to his
work and the accuracy of his reports. Within the meaning of the
section in question, he is truly, both a laborer for, and a servant to
his employer, and is entitled to recover of the stockholders for his
services as reporter for the newspaper, the success of which depends
greatly on his labors. So much for the reporter.
As the ground of demurrer under consideration is that the
complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action, and a good ground of action being found to exist, it may
be considered that the demurrer is not well taken.
But in respect to the "city, or "assistant city editor," of the
newspaper association, if not an officer of the corporation, which he
is not averred to be, I think he is also la laborer and servant thereof- within the meaning of the statute in question.
If an engineer, civil, who intelligently constructs and draws plans,
or mechanical, who superintends the machinery and works of a
corporation, is its servant, the editor, "city" or "assistant,"
employed, and whose service it is to prepare, superintend, revise
and correct a newspaper, or a department thereof for publication,
is within the same terms and is entitled to redress against the
stockholders of the corporation employing him for his work.
As to the other ground of demurrer, that there is a defect of
parties defendant, it is not well taken. The action being under
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the 18th section of the act, the stockholders are jointly and severally
liable.
There must be judgment for the plaintiff oti the demurrer, with
liberty to defendant to answer on payment of costs.
At common law a workman had a
lien on goods in his possession upon
which he had performed labor, and that
was the extent of his preference. Such
is the law at the present day, some of
the states, as Arkansas, Kansas and
Michigan, having enacted statutes to
that effect, while the others hold such to
be the law in numerous decisions. But
the principle of class legislation has in
recent times gone a long way beyond
this. Some of the states have passed
statutes giving laborers on crops, lumber and digging in mines a lien on the
product of their labor, viz. : Georgia,
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New
Hampshire, North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida and Wisconsin. And all
the states have passed laws which resemble each other, known as the Mechanies' Lien Law, and giving to mechanics a lien on buildings, vessels,
mines and wharves, upon which they
have performed work or for which they
have furnished ijaterials.
Many of the states have enacted laws
exempting the wages of laborers from
execution, viz. : California, Iowa, Ken*tucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode
Island, Tennessee and Virginia, while
Kansas on the contrary has enacted that
wages due to clerks, mecbanic, laborers or servants should not be exempted,
although miners' tools and stock in
trade, to the extent of $400, are.
A few states have passed laws giving
a preference to the wages of laborers in
the distribution of estates in the hands
of assignees anl trustees, viz.: California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania.
The last-named state, by an Act of April
9th 1872, declared that all money due

for labor and services rendered by any
miner, mechanic, laborer or clerk, to
any person or chartered company employing clerks, miners, mechanics or
laborers, either as owners, lessees, contractors, or under owners of any works,
mines, manufacturing or other business
where clerks, miners or mechanics are
employed, shall be a lien-and be preferred and be first paid out of'the proceeds of the sale of any propertj, provided the claim does not exceed $200,
and shall not impair existing contracts
and liens. This 'statute differs frorm
those in other states in beifig less
general and sweeping, for while the sta7tutes in the other states usually mentioned "laborers and operatives," this
one names specifically the class of 1aborers, viz. : miners, mechanics, laborers or clerks performing labor in hany
works, mines, manufacturing or other
business where clerks, miner' or me:chanics are employed.
Several states have enacteU that citheir
the directors or stockholders of corpdrations shall he liable for thewages duo
'laboters, servants or apprentices of the
corporation, as Indiana, Massachusetts,
Tennessee and Michigan, which lastmentioned state enacted that the trustees of all institutions of learning should
be liable for the wiges of those who perform labor for the institution. As a
consequence of all these statdtes enactdd
for the protection of the laboring classes, the question has arisen in -anumber
of the states, who is a laborer, within
the provisions of the various statutes,
and a number of decisions have been
"rendered.
In Pennsylvania we find the case of
'Sulliran's Appeal, 77 Penna. St. 107,
'deciding that a cook in a hdtel has not
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a lien and is not a laborer within the
meaning of the act.
Also, the case of Allen v. Fehl, 33
Leg. Tnt. 366, deciding a hotel does not
fall within the terms of the act, the words
being "any works, mines, manufacturing or other business, where clerks, miA
ners or laborers are employed."
hotel is plainly not within the descriptive words and was not meant to be included within the general words "or
other business." These words refer to
some business ejusdem generis, as
"works, mines or manufactory," where
"clerks, miners, mechanics and laborers" are employed.
Also, the case of Slms's Estate, 34
Leg. Int. 169, deciding a laborer on a
farm is Riot within the meaning of the
act, for the same reason. Also, )Ventroth's Appeal, 82 Penna. St. 469, deciding a lumber contractor for a saw-mill,
who did not perform the labor himself,
is not within the meaning of the act.
And the case of The Penna. Railroad
Co. v. Leuffer, 84 Penna. St. 168, deciding a civil engineer is not such a laborer or workman as gives him a preferred claim; Mr. Justice GORDON, in
the opinion of the court saying, "in
seeking the legislative intent, we must
give to the language of the statute its
common and ordinary signification. But
ordinarily these words cannot be understood as embracing persons engaged in
the learned professions, but rather such
as gain their livelihood by manual toil.
Worcester defines a laboreras ' one who
labors ; one regularly employed at some
hard work ; a workman, an operative,
often used of one who gets a livelihood
at coarse, manual labor, as distinguished
"
from an artisan oraprofessional man."'
And Mr. Justice WOODWARD said, in
Seiders'sAppeal, 46 Penna. St. 57, " by
laborers we mean those who perform
with their own hands the contract made
with the employer." And in Bank v.
Gries, 35 Penna. St. 423, deciding an

architect who superintends a building as
well as furnishes the plans, is a laborer
within the meaning of the lien law.
In New Jersey we find a similar decision in the case of the Mutual Benefit
Ins. Co. v. Rowand, 11 C. E. Green
389, which held that an architect who
draws the plans and superintends the
construction of a building has a valid
lien for his services. The court citing
Phillips on Mechanics' Liens, 15, and
Bank v. Gries, supra.
And in Louisiana, in the case of Mulligan v. Mulligan, 18 La. Ann. '20, the
same decision was made.
In Minnesota, in the case of Kn ght
v. Xorris, 13 Minn. 473, the same
decision was made, C. J. WI asoe dissenting, however, on the ground that
a lawyer and architect are on the same
level, as, a lawyer draws the contract
and the architect furnishes the plans.
This view would doubtless be correct
were it not for the fact that an architect
to be able to recover has always, in the
above-mentioned cases, been obliged to
show that he superintended the construction of the building and thus performed
labor in and about the building, which
the lawyer does not do.
And in Nevada; in the case of Capron
v. Stout, II Nevada 304, which was a
suit to foreclose a mortgage on a mine,
the foreman of agang of miners claimed
a lien or preference to be paid before
the mortgage. It was held that he was
within the meaning and protection of
the law. The mortgagor argued that his
employment being foreman was not of
that kind protected by the lien law. It
was said that be performed no work in or
upon the mine, and it was argued that the
intention of the law was to protect those
only who labored with their hands.
* In California, the case of Bursee v.
Griffth, 34 Cal. 302, was where B.,
who claimed two horses were exempt
from execution, was a clerk in a store,
at a stated salary, and had purchased
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said horses mainly to furnish employment for his son, who was seventeen
years of age, and by whom the team was
exclusively used in hauling freight for
said store, and for other lrties, and in
delivering goods from said store to customers, all of which was done for the
benefit of B. and his family ; it was
held that 11. was neither a teamster nor
other laborer in the statutory sense.
Anl in the case of L'Cormick v. Los
Angeles It'-o., 40 Cal. 185, it was held
that a cook employed by contractors or
superintendants to cook for men engaged
in excavating a reservoir, had no lien ;
CROCKETT, J., saying, "if any lien
exists, it nrises not from the place where
the cooking was done, lint from the nature of the services and its relation to
the work which was being constructed.
If the plaintiff can assert a lien on the
facts proved, he could as well have (lone
so if the cooking had been performed at
any other place, and if the mere fact
that a person is employed to cook for
the laborers engaged in erecting a building entitled him to a lien, the same result would follow if he had furnished
the provisions also. On the same theory
a blacksmith who shod the horses, or a
graindealer who furnished them forage,
whilst employed in the work, or a wagonmaker who repaired the carts, would
have a lien.
In Massachusetts the statute provides
that in the distribution of insolvents'
estate the wages due any operative to
the amount of $50, is entitled to preference. The case of Thayer v. Mann,
2 Cush. 371, was where the creditor of
an insolvent debtor received material
from the shop of the insolvent and
worked them up into boots and then delivered them to the debtor, and it was
helu that he was an operative within the
meaning of the act; SHAW, C. 3., saying, "the word ' operative,' without
more qualification than this clause containq, is not definite enough to enable
us to lay down any precise general rule.

Probably the primary thought which legislators had in mind was the wages due
to men and women working in manufactories, who usually receive their pay
weekly or monthly. But certainly it is
not limited to those working for mannfacturers or mechanics, or to persons
working in factories, or workshops.
Whether it shall extend to farm laborers, to house-servants, to persons working singly or in gangs, in woods or on
marshes, or under contractors or public
works at a distance from the home, both
of the employer and the laborer, are all
open questions. We think the policy
of the statute was to secure to a class
of needy and efficient laborers who are
very dependent and meritorious, but
who have little means of knowing the
credit of their employers, the small
amount due them for recent services."
So that we must conclude that much
depends on the language used, and as
different states have used more or less
general words, so have the decisions
been more or less liberal ; for, in New
York we find two statutes similar in
purpose, but using different words.
One uses the words "laborers and servants ;" and the court decides a civil
engineer to he within the meaning of
the words (Conant v. Vein Schaick, 24
Barb. 86), while the other uses the words
"laborers and operatives," leaving out
the word "servants ;" and it was held
a " consulting engineer" was not within
the language of the act: Ericion v.
Brown, 38 Barb. 390.
The test then as to who is a laboring
man, depends primarily upon the language in the particular statute under
which lie asks for protection or preference, and as it is more or less general
and liberal so are the decisions found to
include to a greater or less extent skilled
labor; and in the second place, as expressed in the opinion in the principal
case, upon the character of the work
in relation to the business in which it
J. F. L.
is rendered.

104 .

HUDSON v. SOLOMON.

Supreme Court of Kansas.
B. F. HUDSON v. II. C. SOLOMON.
Ballots cast at an election are the primary and controlling evicence. As bctwecn
the ballots cast at an election arid a canvass of those ballots by the election officers,
the former are the controlling evidence.
In order to continue the ballots controlling as evidence it must appear that they
have been preserved in the manner and by the officers prescribed in the statute, and
that while in such custody they have not been so exposed to the reach of unauthorized persons as to afford a reasonable probability of their having been changed or

tampered with.

Quo WARtANTO.

The facts appear in the opinion.

Everest & Tlaggener, for plaintiff.

John Doniphan and Smith J- Solomon, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BREWER, J.-The question in this case is as to the number of votes
received by the two gentlemen, parties to this action, respectively,
in the second ward of the city of Atchison, at the last city election
for the office of city attorney. The canvass as made by the judges
and clerks of election on the night of the election, gave Mr. Hudson
120 and Mr. Solomon 100 votes. This, in conjunction with the
votes in the other wards, elected Mr'. Solomon by 20 majority. *A
recount of the ballots, made in the presence and under the direction
of the justices of this court, gave Mr. Hudson 143 and Mr. Solomon
100 votes. In addition there was found one ballot, probably intended
for Mrt. Hudson, but wbicb, owing to the ianner in which different
parts of it were pinned together, was not counted by us as cast for
either. This would elect Mr. Hudson.
The question then is, which should prevail, the canvass of the
election officers, or the result as shown by the ballots themselves.
It is a primary rule of elections that the ballots constitute the best,
the primary evidence of the intentions and choice of the voters:
State ex rel. v. Judge, &e., 13 Ala. 805; People ex rel. v. Holden,
28 Cal. 123; McCrary on Elections, sects. 291, 439; Cooley's
Const. Lim., p. 625. In the case from California the court uses
this language: " Intrinsically considered it must be conceded that
the ballots themselves are more reliable, and therefore better evidence than a mere summary of them. Into the latter errors may
find their way, but with the former this cannot happen. The rela-
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tion between the two is at least analogous to that of primary and
secondary evidence." A canvass is but a count of the ballots, a
convenient and expeditious method of determining the choice of the
people as disclosed by the ballots, and therefore but secondary evidence. The necessities of the case make it prima facie evidence,
but unless expressly so declared by statute it is never conclusive:
State ex rel. v. Miarston, 6 Kans. 534; Russell v. Tie State, 11
Id. 308. As between, therefore, the ballots themselves and a
canvass of the ballots, the ballots are controlling. This is of course
upon the supposition that we have before us the very ballots that
were cast by the voters.
And this presents the difficult question in this case. For as under
the manner of our elections there is nothing upon the face of a
ballot to identify it as cast by any particular voter, or even as actually used at any election; nothing to distinguish one ballot from
another of those cast by the members of the same party, as no file
or other mark is made in the canvass or otherwise, after the election,
upon any ballot by which its actual use at such election may thereafter be established, and as at any election there is always a large
surplus of unused ballots, it is evident that if opportunity were
offered ballots might be withdrawn from the box and others substituted with but little chance of detection. Thus in the case before
us, if there was but a single officer to elect, and but a single name
on the ballot, how easily could one having access to the box throw
in twenty-three or four additional ballots and thus bring about the
very difference that appears before us now. And who could thereafter tell which were actually voted and which subsequently thrown
in ? The ballot, then, upon its face containing no marks of identification, we must look aliunde for evidence of the identity of those
offered and counted before us with those actually cast at the election. And this evidence we find in the testimony as to the manner
in which the ballots have been preserved, a comparison of the canvass made as to all the officers voted for at that election with the
result as shown by the ballots, and certain other circumstantial
evidence.
And first as to the preservation of the ballots. It appears that
on the night of the election, as the ballots were called off, they were
strung on a thread as prescribed by the statute: Genl. Stats. 408,
§ 20; that this was done publicly by the judges, in presence of
several spectators ; that after the canvass thus publicly made had
V rL.XXVI.-14
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been completed, the ballots as strung together were sealed up in
an envelope, duly marked and directed to the city clerk, with the
poll books deposited in the ballot box; this box had two covers,
one an inside sliding cover, fastened by a screw, and the other an
outside lifting cover, fastened by a padlock. Both covers were fastened, and the box and key were intrusted to Mr. N. A. Maher,
one of the judges of election, to be by him delivered to the city
clerk.
It appears that after the canvass, which was finished late in the
evening, he carried the box with him to the office of" The Champion," where were gathered quite a number of persons to hear the
election news. After tarrying there a while, he went home, taking
the box with him. He kept the box in his house until the afternoon
of the next day, when he carried it to the office of the city clerk
and delivered it to him. While Mr. Maher had it in his house, it
was deposited in his sleeping room and he carried the key in his
pocket. Mr. Barker, who was city clerk at the time, retained it in
his office and custody for six days, when he was succeedea in office
by the present incumbent, Mr. White, by whom it has since been
kept, part of the time in his office and part of the time in the vaults
of a bank. Four days after Mr. White received it, he placed some
tape around the box and sealed it at the corners, and the seals were
unbroken when brought into our presence.
It thus appears that from the time of the canvass to that of our
examination, the ballots were in the custody of three persons, each
of whom testifies that they were not handled by any one while in
his custody. It appears, also, that the box in which were these
ballots was itself unlocked and opened but four times, and then only
for the purpose of taking out the poll books. Now, unless we
impute to some one of these three parties intentional wrong in opening or permitting to be opened the box, and changing or permitting
to be changed the ballots, and in wilful false swearing upon this
trial, and there is not the least foundation for such an imputation,
it would seem that there could be little doubt that the identical ballots cast at that election have been preserved, and preserved unaltered, and were those examined by us.
But it is said that there were opportunities for reaching and
opening this box and changing the ballots; that this might have
been done at "The Champion" office, at the house of Mr. Maher,
or in the city clerk's office, prior to the sealing of the box by Mr.
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White. It is true there is a possibility of such a thing, but is there
any probability of it? Take " The Champion" office first, and see
what must be assumed. This was the same night and immediately
after the canvass. It must be assumed that some one had a motive.
This implies knowledge of the result of the canvass in the four
wards, and of the iumber of ballots that must be changed. It must
be assunied, also, that the party having motive had knowledge of the
presence of the judge of the second ward election, with the box and
ballots, in "The Champion" office, and had possession of a key
fitting the lock of the box ; that he could take the box off from the
desk of Colonel 'Martin, upon which it was placed.by Mr. MIaher,
in the presence of Mr. Maher and of a large number of parties
eager about election matters; that he could take the box out of the
room, unlock it, make the changes and return it to its proper place
upon the desk, and all this without detection or exposure. This is
so -near the impossible as to be of little moment.
Perhaps the improbability may not be so striking as to the other
places named, but the opportunity afforded, was so slight that it
seems almost like trifling with language to speak of it as an
opportunity.
But beyond the direct testimony as to the manner of keeping the
box and ballots, there is indirect evidence, of value as to the identity
of the ballots. The testimony shows that they were strung on a
thread and then placed in a sealed envelope ; they were so found
by us. It also shows that the straight Republican tickets were
counted first, then the straight Democratic, and then the scratched;
and so we found the ballots arranged on the thread. Again, there
were several offices to be filled at that election, and each ballot had
the names of candidates for respective offices. So we had a count
made of the votes cast for all, so as to compare the result with the
canvass. We found the proper number of ballots in the box, so
that if any had been put in an equal number had been taken out.
For mayor the canvass gave Mr. Downs 232 votes; our count 280;
For police judge, the canvass gave A. Spalding 164 and G. Scoville
79 votes; our count the same. For marshal, the canvass gave
Tofte 130 and Dodson 111 votes; our count Tofte 129 and Dodson
1091. For treasurer of board of education the canvass gave A. II.
Lamphere 285 and our count 236 votes. For member of board
of education the onvass gave A. F. Martin 240 and our count 235
votes. For city treasurer the canvass gave William Bowman 142
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votes, J. M. Lindley 82; our count Bowman 163 and Lindley 82.
So that, except as to Bowman for treasurer and Hudson for city
attorney, the canvass and our count substantially agreed. If any
change, therefore, had been made in the ballots as to the plahintiff it
must have been made so as not to increase the total number of bafllots, so as to preserve to Mr. Solomon the same number of votes,
to add 23 votes to Mr. Hudson, and leave unchanged the votes for
all the other offices, except one of the candidates for city treasurer.
The difficulty of accomplishing this can only be fully appreciated by
one who sits down with 240 ballots, nearly half of which are
scratched, and attempts to make the changes.
But again, it will be perceived that the only substantial difference between the canvass and our count is in the votes cast for
plaintiff and for 3r. Bowman. Now the testimony taken by deposition long before our count, shows that at the time of the canvass
there was some discrepancy between the two clerks, in tallying the
votes for these officers, and that it was claimed that Mr. Tibbals,
one of the clerks, had tallied too many votes for these gentlemen,
and an attempt was made to correct his tally sheets. An examination of the tally sheet kept by Mr. Tibbals showod that he tallied
155 votes for Mr. Hudson and 157 for 'Mr. Bowman, but the tallies
made by the other clerk, 'Mr. O'Keefe, were accepted as correct,
and Mr. Tibbals's sheet corrected accordingly. It is not pretended
that the correction was made by a recount of the votes, but simply
that the tallies were fixed up to the satisfaction of the judges. Over
the tallies as they appear on the sheet of Mfr. O'Keefe, for these
two gentlemen, appears a series of dots, corroborating the testimony
that at the time of the'canvass there was some trouble about the
tallies for these officers All this testimony taken together forces
the conviction on our minds that the ballots have not been clagred
or tampered with.. It is true there is testimony tending in the
other direction, the strongest, perhaps, being that of a disinterested
party who was present at the night of the canvass and kept a tally
of the votes for three of the offices, including that of city attorney,
as called off by the judges, and testifies, that his tally corresponds
with the result as shown by 31r. O'Keefe's sheet and as returned
by the canvassing officers But it is not to be presumed that an
outsider, having no interest in the matter, would be as careful as
the sworn officers, and the fact is established by the testimony, and
patent from the tally sheets, that there was a discrepancy between
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the two clerks as to these two offices, aiid it is undisputed that the
discrepancy was attempted to be corrected without a recount. Other
testimony of the judges and clerks that they made an honest canvass, while it is good anil satisfactory evidence of the honesty of
tikeir intentions, does not preclude the possibility of a, mistake; a
mistake which their own tally sheets show was made by one or
other of their clerks, and which the count made by us shows
resulted to the prejudice of the plaiiitiffs rights.
Some days after the trial had been completed and the case submitted to us for decision, an application was made by defendant to
re-open the trial for the admission of further testimony. The application was based upon these facts. The poll books show the casting
of 245 votes. It appears that one ballot was rejected. Our count
gave to the two candidates 243 votes. Now the defendant files affidavits to the effect, that several ballots were cast upon which there
was no name for city attorney. Such testimony might be very
important. If, for instance it could be clearly established that five
ballots were cast with the name of no one thereon for the office of
city attorney, the inference would seem irresistible that the ballots
before us were not the same as those canvassed, or at least not
untampered with. After reflection, and with some hesitation, we
feel constrained to overrule the application. It was not claimed as
a right, but was an appeal to the discretion of the court, and was
refused principally for these reasons. The pleadings distinctly
gave notice to this question. It concluded that 100 votes were cast
for Mr. Solomon, and alleged that 148 votes were cast for Mr.
IluIson. So that it would plainly tend to defeat the plaintiff's case
to show that there were several ballots upon which was the name
of neither candidate, and reference was made to this fact in the testimony. Now there is nothing in the affidavit to show any good.
reason why this testimony was not introduced upon the trial. Some
of the gentlemen whose affidavits were filed were witnesses already
sworn and examined. The defendant is too good a lawyer not to
have seen the value of such testimony. The manner in which he
has conducted this case shows that he thoroughly understands the
strong points in his favor, and that lie has prepared his defence
with care and industry. Again, to open the case for new testimony
would naturally work delay, and already half the term of office has
expired. Further delay should only be granted upon the clearest
showing. And again, the testimony offered is of a character which,
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conceding the utmost good faith and entire honesty of the affidavits, our knowledge of elections and the manner of conducting them
satisfies us is very liable to be weakened, if not entirely overthrown,
upon cross-examination.
We have .given to this case more attention than perhaps the
importance of the office justifies. The contest is about a city office
of small salary, short term, and not the highest importance. It is
a contest which we think ought to have been commenced and terminated in the district court. But having been brought in this court,
it has given us an occasion for examination of some matters of
importance in reference to elections, and enables us to lay down
these as cardinal rules covering elections and election contests:1. As between the ballots cast at an election and a canvass of
these ballots by the election officers, the former are the primary,
the controlling evidence.
2. In order to continue the ballots controlling as evidence, it
must appear that they have been preserved in the manner and by
the officers prescribed in the statute, and that while in such custody,
they have not been so exposed to the reach of unauthorized persons
as to afford a reasonable probability of their having been changed
or tampered with.
Judgment will be entered in favor of the plaintiff for the possession of the office and $473, the amount of salary and fees admitted
to have been received by the defendant as city attorney.
By sect. 3, art. 3, of the constitution of
Kansas, the Supreme Court is vested
with original jurisdiction in proceedings
in quo warranto, and that such proceeding is the proper one to try the title to a
public office, as it has been repeatedly
held by the courts. The statutory remedy given to contest an election does
not oust the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court by proceedings in quo warranto.
Kane v. People, 4 Nebraska 509; People v. Holden, 28 Cal. 123.
It may now be regarded as in substance a civil proceeding for the determination of purely civil rights, although
the objects to be obtained by the modem
remedy are identical with those secured
by the ancient writ ; and the object now
sought by such proceedings is the speedy

enforcement of a civil right and the
prevention of a public wrong, and the
more effectually to insure the speedy
administration of justice. The statutes
of the several states abolishing the ancient writ or proceedings by information have for their object not the infliction of pains and penalties, as under the
ancient writ, but to prevent the wrongful usurpation of an office or franchise.
High on Extraordinary Remedies, sees.
623, 624.
The right to a public office necessarily
involves a question of broader import
than the mere individual claim of a designated person to enjoy the particular
office brought directly in conflict. The
inquiry is to ascertain, in cases of elective officers, whether the popular will
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has heen, in a given instance, defeated,
or is about to be defeated. Its wholesome purpose is to invite inquiry into
the conduct of popular elections, and
every means legally proper will be made
use of by the court to reach the very
right of the case. The foregoing opinion
is important in enunciating clearly that
no person should be permitted to occupy an elective office who has not received a majority of the votes cast at the
election.
In states where the statutes require
that tile ballots shall be preserved by
certain officers, they become, when so

preserved, in effect record evidence, and
no presumption can arise that they have
been altered or tampered with. People
v. Jiolden, supra.
The ballots and not the returns of the
election officers are the foundation of the
right to hold an office. Election officers for the most part perform ministerial duties and functions only ; their returns and the certificate of election issued upon them are never conclusive in
favor of the officer who would thereby
appear to be chosen, but the final decision must rest with the court. Cooley
Const. Lim., sect. 623.
E.

Supreme Court of the United State8.
JOHN GOOD v. IDA MARTIN.
Where a promissory note made payable to a particular person or order is first
endorsed by a third person, such third person is held to be an original promisor,
guarantor or endorser, according to the nature of the transaction and the understanding of the parties at the time the transaction took place.
If le put his name in blank on the back of the note at the time it was made,
and before it was endorsed by the payee, to give the maker credit with the payee,
or if he participated in the consideration of the note, he must be considered as p
joint maker of the note.
If his endorsement was subsequent to the making of the note and to the delivery of the same to take effect, and he put his name there at the request of the
maker, pursuant to a contract of the maker with the payee for further indulgence
or forbearance, he can only be held as guarantor, and -be is not liable without legal
proof of consideration for the promise, unless it be shown that he was connected
with the inception of the note.
If the note was intended for discount, and he put his name on the back with the
understanding of all the parties that his endorsement would be inoperative until
the instrument was endorsed by the payee, he is liable only as a second endorser
in the commercial sense, and as such is entitled to the privileges which belong to
such an endorser.
A person so signing cannot in any case be a first endorser. He may he a second endorser, but in the absence of any statement by him at the time he is presumed to have signed as a joint maker or guarantor, according as he signs at thu,
making of the note or afterwards, and as he participates or not in the original
consideration.
Parol evidence is admissible to show the circumstances under which he signed.
as they bear upon the foregoing rules.
Territorial courts are not courts of the United States in such sense as to make
parties witnesses in them where there is a different rule prescribed by the territorial statutes.
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ERROR to the Supreme Court of the territory of Colorado.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CLIFFORD, J.-Decisions of a conflicting character exist as to the
nature and legal effect of the obligation which a third person
assumes, who endorses his name in blank on a negotiable promissory note before the payee and before the instrument is delivered
to take effect. Courts of justice, in some jurisdictions, hold that
such a party is a second endorser, even though it be true that the
payee may never endorse the instrument : Phelps v. Viseher, 50 N.
Y. 69 ; Shafer v. Bank, 59 Penna. St. 148.
Even elementary rules show that he eannot be first endorser, for
the reason that he is not payee, and it is well settled law that no
one but the payee can sustain that relation to the maker, or put the
note in circulation as a negotiable instrument: _Essex Co. v. sEdmunds, 12 Gray 276 ; .toies v. Bird, 11 MNass. 440.
Three of the counts of the declaration are framed upon a promissory note, dated June 29th 1866, payable to Alexander Davidson, or order, sixty days after date, signed by the first two defendants, and the record shows that it was endorsed by the other
defendant before it was endorsed by the payee, and before it was
delivered to take effect as a negotiable instrument. Ilis endorsement was in blank, and of course was without any written explanation as to its nature and inteiided effect.
Besides the three counts framed upon the promissory note, the
declaration also contained the common counts, in which it was
alleged that the defendants were indebted to the plaintiff in the
sum of $2000 for work and labor done and performed, and in the
same sum for goods, wares and merchandise sold and delivered, and
in the same sum for money had and received, and other counts in
indebitatus assumpsit.
Service was made, but the two defendants first named failed to
appear, and were defaulted. Instead of that the other defendant
appeared, pleaded the general issue, and wenf to trial. Evidence
was introduced on both sides, and the verdict and judgment were
for the plaintiff in the sum of $3625.33. Exceptions were filed by
the defendant, who went to trial, and he sued out a writ of error,
and removed the cause into this court.
Only two of the exceptions are embodied in the assignment of
errors, and those only will be re-examined. 1. That the court
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erred in instructing the jury that if they found from the evidence
that the defendant wrote his name upon the back of the note before
the delivery of the same to the payee, and that lie did not then
make any statement of his intention in so doing, lie is presumed to
have done so as the surety of the makers and for their accommodation, to give them credit with the payee, and is liable for the payment of the note in this action ; and that if that presumption is
not rebutted by the evidence in the case, they must find for the
plaintiff in the issue, joined between her and the last-named defendant. 2. That the court erred in excluding the testimony of
the two defendants called as witnesses by the defendant, who
appeared and went to trial.
Decided cases almost innumerable affirm the rule that if one, not
the promisee, endorses his name in blank on a negotiable promissory
note before it is endorsed by the payee, and before it is delivered to
take effect as a promissory note, the law presumes that he intended
to give it credit. by becoming liable to pay it either as guarantor,
or as an original promissor : Bryant v. Eastman, 7 Cush. 113;
Benthal v. Judkins, 13 Met. 267; Colbzrn v. Averill, 30 Me.
317.
Different courts, as remarked in that case, hold different views in
respect to the question here involved, but all concur that such an'
act constitutes a contract which is to receive a reasonable and an
available construction. Great conflict exists in the decided cases,
but the better opinion is that there are certain general rules and
principles to be followed in the interpretation of such a contract,
which, in the absence of other evidence, will lead to satisfactory
results, even amid the conflicting decisions.
Beyond all doubt the contract should be construed as it was at
the time it was made. If made at the inception of the 'note, it is
presumed to have been for the same consideration, and a part of
the original contract expressed by the note. If made subsequently
to the (late of the note, and without a prior endorsement by the
payee, it will be presumed that it was not made for the same con-.
sideration, and the party, if liable at all, will be regarded as a guarantor. Such a contract to guaranty tile debt of a third person must
be in writing, and there must be sufficient proof of the consideration:
Brewster v. Silence, 4 Seld. 211 ; Leonard v. T-redenbzurg, 8 Johns.
18 ; Hall v. Farmer, 5 Denio 484.
VOL. XXVI.-15
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These remarks apply where the third person endorses the note
before the payee, but where such a person endorses the note after
a prior endorsement by the payee, the law presumes it to have been
done in aid of the negotiation of the note,, and the party will be
regarded as a subsequent endorser, the rule being that if the
endorsement is without date, it will be presumed to have been
made at the inception of the note: Ranger v. Carey, 1 Met.
(Mass.) 373; Noxon v. De Wolf, 10 Gray 760 ; Collins v. Gilbert,
4 Otto 760.
Irregularities of the kind in the execution of promissory notes
are noticed by Judge STORY in his work on Promissory Notes, and
he says that the maker and such a party are both to be deemed original promissors, and the note a joint and several promissory note to
the payee, although as between the maker and the other party they
stand in the relation of principal and surety. Standard authorities,
too numerous for citation here, are referred to by the author in support of the proposition: Story on Promissory Notes, § 58; Syhl'ester
v. Downer, 20 Vt. 858; Lewis v. Harvey, 18 Mo. 76 ; 1 Parsons on Contracts, 6th ed., 243.
None will deny, it is presumed, that the cases cited sustain the
proposition where the third person endorses his name in blank on
the note at the time when it was made, and before it was endorsed
by the payee; and the same learned author admits that the rule
would be otherwise if the party actually wrote his name at a subsequent period, unless it was done in compliance with an agreement made
before the note was executed; Hawkes v. Phillips, 7 Gray 286;
.Leonard v. Wilder, 36 Me. 268; "7kampionv. Griffil, 13 Ohio
239. Prior decisions of this court are to the same effect, as appears
by the following citation: Bey v. Simpson, 22 IIow. 350.
When a promissory note made payable to a particular person or
order is first -endorsed by a third person, such third person is held
to be an original promisor, guarantor, or endorser, according to
the nature of the transaction and the understanding of the parties
at the time the transaction took place.
1. If he put his name in blank on the back of the note at the
time it was made, and before it was endorsed by the payee, to give
-the maker credit with the payee, or if he participated in the consideration of the note, he must be considered as a joint maker of
the note : Schneider v. Schiffman, 20 Mo. 571; Irish v. Cutler,
31 Me. 537.
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2. Reasonable doubt of the correctness of that rule cannot be
entertaincd; but if his endorsement was subsequent to the making
of the note and to the delivery of the same to take effect, and he
put his name there at the request of the maker, pursuant to a contract of the maker with the payee for further indulgence or forbearance, he can only be held as guarantor, which can only be
done where there is legal proof of consideration for the promise,
unless it be shown that he was connected with the inception of the
note.
3. But if the note was intended for discount, and he put his
name on the back of the note with the understanding of all the
parties that his endorsement would be inoperative until the instrument was endorsed by the payee, he would then be liable only as
a second endorser in the commercial sense, and as such would clearly
be entitled to the privileges which belong to such an endorser.
Considerable diversity of decision, it must be admitted, is found
in the reported cases where the record presents the case of a blank
endorsement by a third party, made before the instrument is endorsed
by the payee, and before it is delivered to take effect, the question
being whether the party is to be deemed an original promisor,
guarantor or endorser. Irreconcilable conflict exists in that regard,
but there is one principle upon the subject almost universally
admitted by them all, and that is that the interpretation of the
contract ought in every case to be such as will carry into effect the
intention of the parties, and in most cases it is admitted that proof
of the facts and circumstances which took place at the time of the
transaction Are admissible to aid in the interpretation of the language
employed: .Denton v. Peters, Law Rep. 5 Q. B. 475.
Facts and circumstances attendant at the time the contract was
made are competent evidence for the purpose of placing the court
in the same situation, and giving the court the same advantages for
construing the contract which were possessed by the actors: Cavazos
v. Trevino, 6 Wall. 784.
Courts of justice may acquaint themselves with the facts and
circumstances that are the subjects of the statements in the written
agreement, and are entitled to place themselves in the same situation
as the parties who made the contract, so as to view the circumstances
as they viewed them, and so to judge of the meaning of the words
and of the correct application of the language to the things described:
Shore v. Wilson, 9 Cl. & Fin. 569 ; Clayton v. arayson, 4 N. &
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Al. 606; Addison on Contracts, 6th cd., 918; 2 Taylor's Ev., 6th
ed., 1035.
Evidence to show that the endorsement of the defendant in this
case was made before the instrument was endorsed by the payee, or
delivered to take effect, was admitted without objection, but it is
not necessary to rest the decision upon that suggestion, as it is clear
that the evidence would have been admissible even if seasonable
objection had been made to its competency : HYopkins v. Leek, 12
Wend. 105.
Like a deed or other written contract, a promissory note takes
effect from delivery, and as the delivery is something that occurs
subsequent to the execution of the instrument, it must necessarily
be a question of fact when the delivery was made. Parol proof
is therefore admissible to show when that took place, as it cannot
appear in the terms of the note: 2 Taylor's Ev., 6th ed., 1001;
HTall v. Cazenove, 4 East 477; Cooper v. Robinson, 10 'Mee. &
Wels. 694.
Opposed to that, the suggestion is, that if a holder pr.oduces a
note having a blank endorsement of one not the payee, the presumption is that it was made at the inceptiobi.
the instrument:
Childs v. Wyman, 44 .Ae. 441. Grant that, a \still it is a mere
presumption of fact, which may be rebutted ad, controlled by
parol proof, that it was not there when the note was deliverc, or
that it was made at a subsequent date: -Essex Co. v. 'lEdmunds,
12 Gray 278.
Third persons endorsing a negotiable promissory note liefore the
payee, and before it is delivered to take effect, cannot- be held as
first endorsers, for the reason that they are not payees, a.d n9 party
but the payee of the note can be the first endorser and ' the instrument in circulation as a commercial negotiable securi -Such
a third party may, if he chooses, take upon himself the limited
obligation of a second endorser, but if he desires to do so, lie must
employ proper terms to signify that intention, the rule being, that
a blank endorsement supposes that there are no such terms employed
and that he is liable either as promisor or guarantor.
Blank endorsements may be filled up to express the legal contract,
and the true commercial rule is that when the blank is filled the
instrument shall have the character of a written instrument, and not
depend on parol proof to give it effect, nor be subject to be altered
or contradicted by parol proof. Endorsements of the kind are or
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may be valid, as the law presumes that such an endorser intended
to be liable in some form. It does not charge him as endorser
unless thc teris employed are proper to express such an intent;
but if any one, not the payee, of a negotiable note, or in the case
of a note not negotiable, if any party writes his name on the back
of the note, at or sufficiently near the tinic it is made, his signature
binds him in the same way as if it was written on the face of the
note, and below that of the maker, that is to say, he is held as a
joint and several maker, according to the form of the note. Cases
also arise where the signature of a third person is subsequent to the
making and delivery of the note, and in that case the third person,
as to the payee, is not a maker but a guarantor, and his promise is
void if without consideration, but the consideration may be the original consideration if the note was received at his request and upon
his promise to ggamntee the same, or if the note was made at his
request and for his benefit: 1 Pars. on Cont., 6th ed., 244.
Judge STORY says, that the interpretation ought to be just such
as carries into effect the true intention of the parties, which may be
made out by parol proof of the facts and circumstances which took
place at the time of the transaction. If the party intended at the
time to be bound only as guarantor of the maker, he shall not be
an original pyomnisor, and if he intended to be liable only as a second
endorser, he shall never be held to the payee as first endorser:
Story on Promissory Notes, § 479.
Where: the evidence on these points is doubtful, obscure or totally
wanting, courts of law adopt rules of interpretation as furnishing
presumptions as to the actual intention of the parties. Difficulty
in that reard can never arise where the endorsement is special, if
it conta1_ words proper to show that the party intended to be liable
only as s&ond endorser. Where the endorsement is in blank, if
made before the payee, the liability must .be either as an original
promisor or guarantor, and parol proof is admissible to show whether
the endorsement was made before the endorsement of the payee, and
before tie instrument was delivered to take effect, or after the
payee had become the holder of the same; and if before, then the
party so endorsing the note may be charged as an original promisor,
but if after the payee became the holder, then such a party can
only be held as guarantor, unless the terms of the endorsement show
that he intended to be liable only as second endorser, in which
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event he is entitled to the privileges accorded to such an endorser
by the commercial law.
Whether regarded as a second endorser or an original promisor,
it is not necessary to allege or prove any other than the original
consideration, but if it be attempted to charge the party as a guarantor, a distinct consideration must appear: Essex County v. Edmunds, 12 Gray 277; Brewster v. Silence, 4 Selden 207.
Viewed- in the light of these suggestions, it is clear that the first
assignment of error must be overruled.
2. Territorial courts are not courts of the United States within
the meaning of the constitution, as appears by all the authorities:
Clinton v. Englebrecht, 13 Wall. 447; Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 18
Id. 653.
Witnesses in civil cases cannot be excluded in the courts of the
United States because he or she is a party to, or interested in, the
issue tried; but the provision has no application in the courts of a
territory, where a different rule prevails: 13 Stats. at Large 851;
Bowman v. Noyes, 12 N. H. 305; Bridges v. Armour, 5 How. 94;
Bailey v. Knapp, 7 Harris 193; H7atz v. Snyder, 2 Casey 512.
Suppose that is so, then the two defendants called as witnesses
were rightly rejected as witnesses: 13 Stats. at Large 351.
Special reference is made to the territorial Act of the 11th of
February 1870, as inconsistent with the ruling of the court, but
the act in question contains the following proviso: that the act
"shall not apply to cases pending at the passage thereof in the district courts, on appeals from justices of the peace, nor to cases at
issfie at the passage of the same in the district and probate courts."
Sufficient appears to show that the case before the court was at
issue in the court below one whole year before the passage of
that act.
Tested by these considerations, it is clear that the second assignment of error must also be overruled, and that there is no error in
the record.
Judgment affirmed.
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APPELLANT.

A party to an action in a court of justice has a right to obtain the exact and full
truth touching all matters in issue in the action, and for this purpose to compel
the production of testimony under the control of the adverse party.
This rule applied where a plaintiff sued for damages from negligence claimed to
have produced a permanent disability. In such a case the defendant may compel
plaintiff to submit to a personal examination by physicians to enable them to testify to the nature and extent of his injuries.
An order on the plaintiff to submit himself to such examination may be enforced
by the court by proceedings for contempt, or by striking out of plaintiff's case all
claim for permanent injury.

from Clinton Circuit Court.
Action to recover for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff while
in the employment of defendant, by reason of the negligence of defendant's employees. There was a verdict and judgment for plaintiff; defendant appealed. The facts involved in the questions of law
determined .by the court are found in the opinion. The case has
before been in this court upon a former appeal by defendant. See
41 Iowa 344.
APPEAL

Cook & Rlichman, for appellant.
W. A. Foster, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BEcK, J.-I.
Plaintiff, with numerous other men, was employed
by defendant in taking down and removing its old railroad briage
across the Mississippi river, between Davenport and Rock Island.
The timbers of the bridge were, when taken down, placed upon cars,
and, in that manner, transported to a place convenient for depositing them. To reach this place with the train it was necessary to draw
it wesf ard with an engine, and, at a certain point, change it, by
means of a "switch," to another track, upon which it was "backed"
to the place where the load was deposited. Plaintiff was required, by
the employee of defendant, under whose direction he was working,
to go from the bridge, when the train had received its load, with it,
in order to assist in. unloading the timbers. With other men he
went upon the train and seated himself upon the timbers. In
backing, the timbers, upon which he was sitting, were thrown off
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the car and plaintiff was also thrown to the ground, the timbers, or
some of them, fidling upon him. Plaintiff claims that the accident
occurred through th negligence of defendant's employees, and that
the injuries he received were severe and permanent in their character, and have so flin disabled him that he cannot engage in cin- "
ployments requiring ordinary strength and vigor.
I. The issues of the case involved the extent of the injuries
inflicted upon plaintiff, and their effect upon his health and strength:
He testified, upon the first trial, that he was so far disabled that he
could not engage in labor requiring the exerciie of common strength
and activity. His testimony was to the effect, that his hips and
back were the seats of great pain, and that the injuries hid impaired
his nervous system, and that his limbs and some -of his internal
organs were, to an extent, paralyzed. After the jury were empaneiled, and before the introduction of any testimony, the defendant
filed a written application, asking a proper order of the court be
made, requiring the plaintiff to submit to an examination,.by physicians and surgeons, that they might determine the true condition
of his health and the character and extent of his ailments, to' the
end that it might be known wvhetlher, indeed, he-was suffering from
any disability, and -ifso fonffd, whether it originated from the injuries sustained by the timbers falling upon him, as claimed by him hr
his petition and testimony. The defendant in its application asked
that such examination' should be made by a proper nutaber of physicians, to be selected, in equal numbers, by plaintiff and defendant,
and, it was proposed by defendant, that its own medical officer should
not be one of the number, and that the expenses of such examination would be paid by defendant. In support of this application
the affidavit of a surgeon and physician in the employment of defendant was filed, stating that lie had professionally attended plaintiff
immediately after he was injured, and he made personal observations'
of plaintiff's condition, and had heard his testimony at the former
trial, and that it was his belief, based upon this means of knowledge, his injuries were not of the character and extent claimed by
him, and that the truth of the matter could be ascertained by a proper personal examination of the plaintiff. This application was
resisted by plaintiff by exceptions, and an affidavit of himself, which
show, among other matters, that it was not made until after the jury
were sworn; that plaintiff had no witness present except himself,
who could testify to his physical condition, for the reason that the
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printed testimony of the physicians at the first trial, used in the
Supreme Court, by consent of parties was to be read upon this trial
by plaintiff; that a number of physicians were in attendance at the
court through the procurement of defendant, who, plaintiff charged,
were interested against him ; that plaintiff is not acquainted with
physicians in the county where the case was on trial, the venue having been changed from Scott county, and that he is without means
to procure the attendance of physicians for the purpose of an examination. It is also alleged in the exceptions "that the affection
from which plaintiff now suffers is a nervous derangement, injury
of the bowels and partial paralysis," and, as shown upon the former
trial, an examination would fail to reveal the extent and character
of his ailments. The plaintiff further insisted that the court had
no authority to order the examination to be made, aid no power to
enforce such an order, if made. The application was overruled on
the ground that defendant was not entitled, as a matter of right, to
the order sought.
The plaintiff testified in the course of the trial, that his back and
internal organs of the lower part of the body were affected by the
injury, and that one of his legs was disabled to an extent that
deprived him of its full use, and that he thought it appeared to be
smaller and somewhat shrunken. Upon the cross-examination, after
having stated the condition of his legs, he was asked if he was
willing to pelmit his limbs to be examined by physicians. His
c6unsel objected to the question, and the court did not permit it to
be propounded to him. These rulings are the subject of separate
objections on the part of defendant. As they present substantially
the same question they may be considered together.
III. The plaintiff must be regarded as objecting to an examination of the diseased parts of his body by competent physicians and
surgeons, although no objection thereto was formally expressed by
him. His resistance to the application made by defendant and his
objection to the interrogatory, must be regarded as a refusal on his
part to consent to an examination. The first ruling of the court is
based upon the ground that it possessed no authority to order the
examination demanded as a matter of right possessed by defendant.
We are to understand that the like reason controlled the decision
upon the competency of the question objected to by defendant. It
seems quite clear that if defendant had no right to require plaintiff
to submit to the examination of his person, the court rightly decided
VOL. XXVI.-16
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in overruling defendant's application. The same is true as to the
ruling upon the interrogatory. If the plaintiff had answered the
question negatively, or refused to answer, the court could not, in
this view of the law, have required an answer, or required plaintiff
to submit to the examination; therefore, if the rule recognised by
the court is correct, it would have been vain to have ruled differently.
The converse of this proposition must be true, namely: if the
defendant was entitled, as a matter of right, to have the person of
plaintiff examined, the court possessed the authority and power to
order it and to enforce its order. This cannot be'doubted. As to
the manner of enforcing the order we may have something to say
hereafter. As the decisions of the court under consideration were
based upon the view that defendant could not demand the examination of plaintiff as a matter of right, the soundness of the doctrine
must be first considered.
IV. Whoever is a party to an action in a court, whether a natural
person or a corporation, has a right to demand therein the administration of exact justice. This right Can only be secured and fully
maintained by obtaining the exact and full truth touching all matters
in issue in the action. If truth be hidden injustice will be done.
The right of the suitor, then, to demand the whole truth is unquestioned; it is the correllation of.ther right to exact justice. It is
true, indeed, that on account of the imperfections incident to human
nature, perfect truth may not always be attained, aRd because of
the inability of courts to obtain truth in entire fulness, justice may
not always be administered. We are often compelled to accept
approximate justice as the best that courts can do in the administration of the law. But while the law is satisfied with approximate
justice, where exact justice cannot be attained, the courts should
recognise no rules which stop at the first when the second is in
reach. Those rules, too, which lead nearer the first should be
adopted in preference to others which end at points more remote.
This doctrine lies at the foundation of the rules of evidence, though,
it must be confessed, the superstructure does not always fully conform thereto. Great progress, however, in a comparatively recent
period, has been made by legislation and judicial-decisions in the
work of conforming the system of evidence to this germinal principle.
The-most noticeable of the steps in this progress is the abrogation
of the rule which precluded parties to actions from giving testimony
therein. This rule, however, was mistakenly supposed to be in
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harmony with the principle just stated. It was believed that the
interest of parties to actions would cause them, as witnesses, to
prevent the truth or conceal it. But when it was discovered that
as a rule, this was an erroneous conclusion, legislation was invoked
enabling parties to testify. The wisdom of the change has been
fully -vindicated by experience. In the case before us plaintiff
claims to recover for injuries sustained on the 6th day of November
1872; in December 1874 the first trial was had. He claims in
his pleadings, and so testified on the former trial, that the injuries
produced permanent disability; the like testimony he repeated at
the last trial. It quite satisfactorily appeared by the application of defendant for an order requiring his examination and
the affidavit supporting it, that the full effect of the injuries
and the extent of his disability could have been determined by
physicians and surgeons upon an examination of the body of
plaintiff. This we think was clearly established by the professional testimony given at the trial. It appears that no thorough
and careful examination was made by physicians since the first trial,
and indeed it may be well claimed that no such examination was
made at any time after the physicians ceased to attend upon him
for the injuries. His testimony at the first trial, as well as at the
second, was to the effect that he suffered continually from the
injuries, and his disability was of a character that would probably
be permanmt. They decided, indeed the very great preponderance
of the evidence, apart from his own testimony, was to the effect that
the injuries had wrought no such effect as claimed by plaintiff.
The medical witnesses unite in testifying that an examination of
his person would reveal, almost certainly, his true condition. Indeed
the showing made by defendant, upon the application for examination as to the nature of his disease, authorized such a conclusion.
To our minds the proposition is plain, that a proper examination by
learned and skilful physicians and surgeons would have opened a
road by which the cause could have been conducted nearer to exact
justice than in any other way. The plaintiff, as it were, had under
his own control testimony which would have revealed the truth
more clearly than any other testimony that could have been introduced. The cause of truth, the right administration of the law,
demand that he should have produced it.
V. We will consider the objections urged to this view of the
case. It hardly appears that the objections urged in the exceptions
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of plaintiff to defendant s application ought to be here considered,
as the court below held none of them good, but decided the point
upon the ground that defendant asked for a matter to which it had
no right. It is, however, proper to remark, that the inability of
plaintiff to pay physicians who should make the examiriation was
no impediment to the order, as defendant proposed to furnish the
means required. The facts that the application was made after the
jury was sworn, and plaintiff knew no physicians in the county of
the trial, do not appear to be well founded objections to allowing
the order, for it does not appear that ample time couldnot have been
allowed by the court for the examination in a manner that would
have proved satisfactory to plaintiff. The fact that defendant had
present in court so many physicians, charged by plaintiff with having an undue interest against him, was no sound objection, for the
court could and should have refused to appoint any such to make
the examination.
VI. But it is urged, the court was clothed with no power to
enforce cbedience of plaintiff, had such an order been mad6. Its
power, in our judgment, was amply sufficient to coerce obedience.
The plaintiff would have been ordered by the court, by submitting"
his person to examination, to permit the introduction of testimony
in the case. His refusal would have been an impediment to the
administration of justice, and a contempt of the court's authority.
He would have been subject to punishment as a recusant witness
who refused to answer proper questions propounded to him. Should
such' recusancy too long delay the court, or prove an effective
obstruction to the progress of the case, the court could have stricken
from the pleadings all the allegations as to permanent injury, and
withdrawn from the jury that part of the case. The plaintiff, by
voluntarily withdrawing his claim for such injury, would have been
relieved from the necessity of submitting to the examination, and
proceedings as for contempt would have been suspended.
When it is remembered that plaintiff was a witness before the
court, that the examination of his person would have been, in effect,
a means to elicit testimony from him as upon a cross-examination,
the power of the court over him will be readily understood.
VII. It is said that the examination would have subjected him
to danger of his life, pain of body, and indignity to his person.
The reply to this is, that it should not. and the court would have
been careful to so order and direct. Under the explicit directions
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of tile court, the physicians should have been restrained from imperilling, in any degree, the life or health of the plaintiff. The ui-e of
anesthetics, opiates, or drugs of any kind, shold have been forbiddel/if, indeed, it had been proposed, and the order should have
prescribed that he should have been subjected to no tests.painful in
their character. As to indignity to which an examination would
have subjected him, as urge I by counsel, it is probably more imaginary than real. An examination of the person is not so regarded
when made for the purpose of administering remedies. Those who
effect insurance upon their lives, pensioners for disability incurred
in the military service of the country, soldier. and sailors enlisting
in the army and navy, all are subjected to rigid examination of
their bodies, and it is never esteemed a dishonor or indignity. The
standing and character of the physicians ido should have been
appointed to make tli examination, would not only have secured
plaintiff from insult and indignity, but would have been a guaranty
that nothing would have been attempted which would have endangered his life or health.
VIII. We have been able to find no case in which the question
before us has been considered, and we have been referred to no
authority by counsel that seems to have much application thereto.
The courts have held in divorce cases, when the impotency of a
party is in question, an examination may be ordered of the person
alleged to be impotent: see 2 Bishop on Marriage and Divorce, seo.
590 et seq., and notes. The foundation of this rule is the difficulty
of reaching the truth in any other way than by an examination of
the person. The authorities referred to may be regarded as giving
some support to our conclusions.
IX. It is the practice of the courts of this state, sanctioned by
more than one decision of this court, to permit plaintiffs who sue
for personal injuries to exhibit to the jury their wounds or injured
limbs, in order to show the extent of their disability or suffering.
If, for this purpose, the plaintiff may exhibit his injuries, we see
no reason why he may not, in a proper case and under proper circumstances, be required to do the same thing for a like purpose
upon the request of the other party. If he may be required to
exhibit his body to the jury, he ought to be required to submit it to
examination of competent professional men.
X. The court instructed the jury that they were authorized to
regard plaintiff's refusal to submit to an examination as an admis-
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sion that the examination, if made, would have been against his
interest in the suit. It is argued that this familiar rule of law
would alone relieve defendant from the effect of prejudice on account
of the refusal of plaintiff to be examined. This position is not correct.
The defem.dant is left to depend upon the inference of the jury,
which might or might not have been exercised, instead of having
the truth disclosed by direct and positive evidence. The law wil
not require a party to depend upon such inferences, when it can
afford the means of producing competent evidence upon the question in issue.
XI. Certain instructions given by the court on its own motion
and modifications -of those given upon request of defendant, are
complained of as being erroneous. The rule announced by the
court in these instructiofis is substantially to this'effect: that if
the plaintiff was employed for the purpose of taking down and
removing the bridge, and in doing this work a train was used on
defendant's road upon which plaintiff, in the course of his employment and in obedience to the requirement of his superior, was riding
at the time he sustained the injury, he was engaged in operating
the road, and the defendant, if its negligence and the care of plaintiff was found, was liable under the statute. The rule contemplates
the case of the train being 6perated for the purpose of removing
the bridge. The purpose 'for which it is operated cannot relieve
defendant of liability, if the injury was sustained in its operation.
If it were a part of plaintiff's employment to go upon the train,
and he did so in the discharge of his duty, he is to be regarded as
having been engaged in its operation, or his employment was connected with its operation. The rule of the instruction is correct,
and is fully supported by Deppie v, C., B. . 6 P. Railroad Co.,
36 Iowa 52. We discover no error in the other instructions given.
to the jury.
Other objections urged by defendant's counsel relate to the findings of the jury upon several issues raised'by the pleadings, which
it is claimed are in conflict with the testimony. We are not
required to pass upon these objections, as the judgment for the
error of the court in refusing to require plaintiff to submit to an
examination must be reversed.
Reversed.

UXITED STATES v. CRAFTON.

United States Circuit Court.

Western District of Jlfissouri.

UNITED STATES v. CRAFTON.
An indictment founded upon 5440 of the Revised Statutes, alleging generally
a conspiracy to defraud the United States, but failing to set forth the nature of
the fraud, and the manner in which or the means by which it was to be effected,
is insufficient, and a demurrer therefore will be sustained.
A conspiracy to defraud the United States cannot exist in contemplation of said
5440, where the contemplated fraud depends upon the passage of a future act
of Congress to make it effective.
DEMURRER to indictment for conspiracy to defraud the United
States.
The indictment in substance charged:1. That John D. Crafton, one of the defendants, was, at the time
charged, the adjutant-general and acting paymaster-general of the
state of Missouri; that John D. Crafton, Jr., was a clerk in his
office; that the defendants, George M. Irvin, John C. Bender and
Waller Young, were acting as the agents and attorneys for the collection of a claim and demand alleged to be due the members of a
certain company of enrolled Missouri militia, growing out of their
alleged services in the war for the suppression of the rebellion.
2. That for the purpose of defrauding the United States out of
the money alleged to be due for such services, the said defendants
conspired together to obtain the payment thereof out of the treasury
of the United States.
3. That to effect the object of said conspiracy, the defendants
Irvin, Bender and Young, made a false and fictitious muster and
pay-roll of said company, and presented the same to the defendant,
John D. Crafton, as such acting paymaster-general, to audit, approve and allow the claim contained in said roll.
4. That to further effect the object of said conspiracy, the defendant, John D. Crafton, as acting paymaster-general, did audit,-approve and allow such claim, and issued certificates of indebtedness
of the state of Missouri, for the amount claimed to be due on said
roll, and delivered them to the defendant Young.
5. That further to effect the object of the conspiracy, all of the
defendants transmitted the false and fictitious muster and pay-roll
of said company to the third auditor of the treasury of the United
States, with the amount on said roll as audited, approved and
allowed, and showing the issue of the certificates of indebtedness
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therefor-for file by the third auditor in the treasury department of
the United States, until such time as Congress should thereafter
provide for the payment of the fraudulent claim contained in and
upon said roll.
6. rhat further to effect the object of the conspiracy, the defendants employe'd Craig and Strong to secure the passage of a bill
which had been introduced in the Senate of the United States for
the payment of said fraudulent claims.
A. IV.11fullins, for the United States.

H. B. Johnson, Jtff. Ultandler and A. 3. Lay, for defendants.
The opinion of the cofirt was delivered by
DtmtoN, Circuit Judge.-The indictment is founded upon sect.
5440 of the Revised Statutes, which is as follows: " If two or more
per-,ou. conspire * * * to defraud the United States in any manner
or for any purpose, and one or more of such parties do any act to
effect the object of the conspiracy, all the parties to such conspiracy
shall be liable to a penalty of," &c. The nature of the acts charged
against the defendants in the indictment are more fully seen by
reference to the act of the legislature of Missouri, approved March
19th 1874, entitled, "An act to audit and adjust the war debt of
the state :" Laws 1874, p. 102, sect. 10, et seq. The claims "of
officers and soldiers of the enrolled Missouri militia" were primarily,
and until assumed by Congress exclusively, against the state and
not against the general government. The latter has never assumed
their payment; if at the time that the acts set forth in the indictment were done the general government had provided for the payment of such claims out of its own treasury, undoubtedly those
acts, fraudulent in their nature and object, would have been criminally punishable. It is at just this point that the case stated in the
indictment is vulnerable. Under the recognised rules of criminal
pleading it is not sufficient to allege generally a conspiracy to defraud,
but the nature of the fraud and to the required extent the manner
in which or the means by which it was to be effected, must be
averred: United States v. Cruiksliank, 2 Otto 542, 558. In the
case at bar, this has been attempted by the pleader, but the difficulty is that it appears from the averments that the alleged conspiracy to defraud the United States was under the existing legislation
of Congress legally impossible. The fraudulent muster and pay-

